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International clamor regarding the potential degradation of the environment
in developing countries due to opening to trade has been an important issue that
has moved from the streets into academic studies. This dissertation links the
e¤ect of opening to trade on resource stocks in developing countries by endoge-
nizing the property rights regime choice. The model explains how communities
that have communal ownership of a resource stock select the property rights
regime governing the use of their resource stock via a voting mechanism. Then,
the impact of opening to trade is linked to the choice of the property rights regime
and, ultimately, to stock changes over time.
We found that under some plausible assumptions, community members would
vote to allow non-community members into the resource sector. Opening to trade,
when the country has comparative advantage in the production of resource inten-
sive goods, does result in a decrease in the long-run equilibrium stock. However,
as long as property rights regimes are endogenous and the country follows the
optimal trajectory path, we nd that degrading the resource stock can be an
optimal solution.
A dynamic common property resource game with two sectors in the economy was
designed and implemented to test some of the theoretical results. Experimental
results indicated that subjects followed a dynamic path, but not the optimal one.
The initial choices of the subjects greatly inuenced the path which they take in
the future. Without instruments or tools to correct for mistakes made during the
initial time periods, communities will most likely follow a non-optimal dynamic
path.
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Common pool resources, such as sheries, irrigation systems and grazing areas,
serve important roles in the development and livelihood of communities in de-
veloping countries. There may be no restriction on the use of the common pool
resources (open access) or its use can be governed by an individual (private prop-
erty) or a group of individuals (common property). Private-property ownership is
a potentially e¤ective way of managing the use of a resource. However, this type
of ownership may not always be feasible. In developing countries where whole
communities claim ownership to a particular resource, it is not uncommon to nd
community-based management schemes governing the use of common property
resources.
Extraction from common pool resources is often characterized as over-harvested.
Over extraction can be attributed to users of the resource stock failing to inter-
nalize two types of externalities. The rst is an intra-temporal externality or
crowding out e¤ect,where own harvest a¤ects the availability of harvest for
other users during the current time. The second is an inter-temporal externality
or stock e¤ectin which current harvest decreases available stock for the future.
The type of property rights regime governing the use of the resource stock is
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instrumental in determining how well the resource stock is managed over time
and the e¤ect of any externality on harvest (Anderson and Simmons, 1993). As
communities who have de facto rights over the use of the resource evolve and
as the institutions governing resource use develop, the type of property rights
regime can also change over time, which has a signicant impact on the resource
stock.
Studies have argued the need to model property rights regime as endogenous
(Anderson and Hill, 1975; Field, 1989; De Meza and Gould, 1992; Hotte, et al.,
2000). Property rights can evolve from an open-access regime to community-
managed open access regime or even to private-property management. Factors
such as the existing number of agents in the community, type of agents in the com-
munity, cost of enforcing property rights, availability of local government support
to enforce laws and economic conditions a¤ect the decision of the community to
adopt a particular property rights regime (Baland and Platteau, 1997a, 1997b,
Umbeck, 1981). However, one important factor that determines the choice of
property rights regimes governing a particular common property resource is the
political economy structure prevailing within communities.
Aside from the direct impact of the political economy structure of the gov-
erning community on resource stocks, we also look into the e¤ect of opening the
resource stock to trade via property rights regime changes. Opening to trade can
adversely a¤ect the natural resource stock, and consequently, welfare, of countries
that have poorly-dened property rights regimes. Chichilnisky (1994) formulated
a static model to show that developing countries with poorly dened property
rights regimes will earn short-run gains from trade but their welfare decreases
in the long-run. Similarly, Brander and Taylor (1997a) developed a two-sector
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general equilibrium model with a dynamic resource stock showing the e¤ect of
opening to trade on a small open economy. Short-run welfare gains are derived
from trade, but in the long run, these gains are o¤set by continual resource
depletion. In both of these studies, the underlying assumption that drives the
results of their models is that property rights regimes are exogenous. The lack of
well-dened property rights causes over-use of the resource stock and can be ex-
acerbated by increases in the demand of output derived from the stock. However,
in reality, property rights regimes change over time.
In this dissertation, a thorough analysis of the dynamic link between interna-
tional trade, property rights regimes in common property resources and resource
stocks over time is provided. In order to understand the e¤ect of trade on resource
stocks, it is rst important to understand how property rights regime change via
a political economy process. Deriving and understanding how property rights
regimes evolve over time is important because these institutions determine the
long-run sustainability of any natural resource stock (Adger and Luttrell, 2000).
Once we have established the link between endogenous property rights regimes
and their e¤ect on the resource stock, we can derive the total e¤ect of opening
to trade on resource stocks.
One of the main ndings in this dissertation is that the choice of the property
rights regime governing the use of the resource stock is a¤ected by the crowding
out e¤ect and stock e¤ect. A nite number of property rights regime patterns,
which maximize the welfare of owners of a resource stock, are derived. Opening
to trade a¤ects the choice of property rights regimes as well as the resource stock.
Communities that have comparative advantage in the production of a resource-
based good may allow the stock to grow prior to the opening of trade. However,
3
the long-run equilibrium resource stock declines even with endogenous property
rights regimes under communal management. The decision of the community to
degrade their resource stock is not solely motivated by myopic welfare gains but
by a solution that maximizes wealth over time.
1.1 Literature Review
This dissertation is related to two broad areas of the existing literature: (1)
property rights and natural resource use; and (2) the e¤ect of trade on the envi-
ronment.
1.1.1 Property Rights and Natural Resource Use
Community-owned or community-managed resource stocks characterize a number
of property rights regimes in developing countries (Maggs and Hoddinott, 1997).
Coastal shery resources, forest tracts, and grazing land are some of the examples
of natural resources that are community-managed in developing countries. The
type of property rights regime, whether formal or informal, can adversely or
favorably impact the natural resource stock. In some countries occupying the
Amazon Basin and in the outer islands of Indonesia, farmers clear unprotected
forest areas because they fear that failure to do so would mean losing the land
to their neighboring competitor (Rudel, 1995). Due to the open-access nature of
the resource, as well as lack of formal social control by governments, open-access
regimes are commonly believed to go hand in hand with resource depletion.
Conventional theorists assume that only an all powerful government can limit
the use of a resource stock. However, informal social control from the community
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using the resource stock also plays a signicant role in determining the long-run
stock of a resource. Indigenous groups have their own customary laws that can
protect the resource stock. By imposing informal social controls, communities
limit the access of the resource stock to non-community residents (McCay and Acheson, 1987).
Such practices have been observed in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Japan, the Philippines, Spain and Switzerland (Reinhart, 1988; Ostrom, 1990;
Cruz, et al., 1992; Wright, 1992).
Social controls, whether formal or informal, change over time. In Amazonian
Ecuador, the Ecuadorian government passed a law which stated that claimants
could establish ownership through use. A signicant number of peasants migrated
to the Amazon. This migration resulted in settlement and deforestation during
the late 1960s. By 1970, a set of informal social controls among settlers began
which discouraged land invasions and land clearings in disputed areas resulting in
less deforestation (Rudel, 1995). In San Miguel Bay, Philippines, the shery stock
was depleted due to overshing during the 1980s. However, after the institution
of formal organizations aimed at managing the resource through the community,
less pressure has been put on the shery stock (Sumalde and Pedroso, 2001).
Aside from anecdotes relating property rights regimes and their e¤ect on re-
source stocks, theoretical models also exist. The current property rights regime
can signicantly a¤ect the use of a resource stock (Angelsen, 1999). Private-
property ownership is usually deemed e¤ective because owners internalize any
existing externality associated with the use of a resource. However, shifting from
complete open-access to private-property ownership is not always feasible. Given
the di¢ culty in establishing government control of common property resources,
especially in developing countries, several studies have advocated the development
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of community-based management schemes to preserve and increase environmental
quality (Ostrom, 1990; Sandler, 1992; Baland and Platteau, 1996).
The evolution of property rights regimes can not only protect the environ-
ment, but also reduce uncertainty and increase e¢ ciency in the market of the
resource (Feder and Feeny, 1991). The decision for any community to change the
existing institution governing the use of a resource stock can be modelled using
a voting mechanism (Vyrastekova and Van Soest, 2003). Di¤erent voting rules
that govern a polity exist. The most common voting rule under a pure democratic
regime is a majority voting rule. Under a majority voting rule, only half of the
population plus one is required to support or carry out any issue (Mueller, 1979).1
In this voting rule, the preference of the median voter determines the outcome
of any election. Therefore, if the median voter derives more utility from the
adoption of a particular program, he would vote to establish that program.
The literature has largely ignored the role of community voting in determin-
ing the governing institution that regulates the use of a resource stock. This
dissertation develops a model about the voting equilibrium of a community that
institutes the property rights regime governing the use of a resource stock.
1.1.2 Trade and the Environment
The pioneers in the trade and environment literature began publishing during
the early 1970s (Baumol, 1971; Magee and Ford, 1972; Walter, 1973). However,
1In reality, representative democracies that exist in various countries may not necessarily
adhere to the majority voting rule. In the United States for example, the choice for presidency
depends upon the electoral college and not the popular vote. Here, one may lose the popular
vote but win the electoral college due to the preference of a "minority." Thus, caution must
be taken in interpreting and applying results from the model to the real world.
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increased public awareness of the potential threat on environmental quality by
opening to trade has resulted in a substantial expansion in the trade and en-
vironment literature. Panayatou (1993) denes the environment as both the
quantity and quality of natural resources, renewable and nonrenewable. The
environment can be categorized into two types: natural resource stocks, such
as mines, forests and sheries; and the ambient environment, which consists of
water, air, landscape and the atmosphere. In the model, we focus on the former
type.
Little or no direct link (price e¤ects) relating the e¤ect of trade on the en-
vironment has been found empirically or theoretically (Antweiler, et al., 2001;
Alpay, 2001; Copeland and Gulati, 2004; Copeland, 2000; Copeland and Taylor, 2004;
Kahn and McDonald, 1994; Shak, 1994).2 However, trade policies can signif-
icantly a¤ect either the natural resource stocks or the ambient environment
through factors that inuence the comparative advantage of countries. Some
of the determinants of comparative advantage among countries through which
trade may a¤ect the environment are the di¤erences in endowments of natural
resources, technological e¢ ciency, governing institutions, and property rights
regimes (Abler, et al., 1999; Antweiler, et al., 2001; Alpay, 2001; Bourgeon and López, 1999;
Brander and Taylor, 1997a and 1997b; Chichilnisky, 1994; Copeland and Taylor, 1994;
López and Galinato, 2005; Chintrakarn and Millimet, 2006).
Countries that specialize in dirty (clean) technologies will increase dirty (clean)
output as trade liberalization occurs, consequently depreciating (improving) en-
2There is a related strand in the literature that evaluates the potential causal link between
the environment and trade ows. Tightening of environmental regulations have been shown to
signicantly impact the choice of plant loaction and trade ows at the margin (see Copeland
and Taylor, 1994 for a review of these studies).
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vironmental quality (Grossman and Krueger, 1991). Similarly, countries that are
endowed with more natural resources tend to specialize in goods that are natural
resource intensive. As the economy of these countries opens to trade, more pres-
sure is put on the natural resource stock during trade liberalization (Alpay, 2001).
Countries with more open access to natural resources or less stringent envi-
ronmental regulations gain comparative advantage in the production of resource-
based goods relative to other countries with more developed institutions. Devel-
oping countries have relatively less developed property rights regime governing
the use of a resource stock compared with more developed countries. Conse-
quently, developing countries with weak institutions will likely see a degradation
of natural resource stock and decline in social welfare (Chichilnisky, 1994; Bran-
der and Taylor, 1997a and 1998).
However, existing institutions can evolve from an open-access regime to a more
protected system. Margolis and Shogren (2002) extend the North-South trade
model of Chichilnisky by allowing for endogenous property enforcement rights.
Given a specic set of world prices, they show that welfare losses can occur even
when local governments make choices to close the hinterland. Hotte, et al. (2000)
develop a model of trade and dynamic resource stock with the cost of enforcing
property rights endogenized. They show that by opening to trade, a country
changes the enforcement level governing resource use, which results in a greater
resource stock. Social welfare could decrease if the gains from the current owner
of the resource from enforcing the property right are outweighed by the loss of
income from poachers of the resource stock. In reality, individuals have the option
of working in various sectors of an economy. It would be interesting to look at
how members of a community, who have de facto property rights to a resource
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stock, govern its use when employment opportunities are available elsewhere.
This dissertation investigates how the choice of a community to manage a
particular resource stock is a¤ected by economic conditions, such as trade. Since
we focus mostly on small communities within an economy, we disregard any po-
tential feedback that resource regulation may create on trade ows. Of particular
interest in this study is to model how property rights evolve via a voting mech-
anism within agents of a community. The e¤ect of voting on the choice of the
governing rule of the use of a resource stock in a dynamic economic framework
has largely been ignored by the literature so far.
1.2 Main Results
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a
dynamic two-sector general-equilibrium model that analyzes the type of property
rights regime governing the use of a dynamic common property resource. Chapter
3 links the e¤ect of opening to trade on the choice of the property rights regime
and the resource stock. Chapter 4 extends the basic theoretical framework by
endogenizing the trade regime choice by the government. Chapter 5 tests selected
hypotheses derived from the theoretical results of the model using a laboratory
experiment. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation.
The general framework that is used in the dissertation is a dynamic two-sector
general equilibrium model, which is akin to a dynamic version of a Ricardo-Viner
model. There are two sectors in the economy, a resource sector and a manu-
facturing sector, and three types of inputs: capital, a dynamic resource stock,
and labor. The type of labor can come from two sources: the community and
non-community. The main di¤erence between the two sources of labor is that
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individuals from the community have de facto property rights over the use of a
resource stock while non-community members do not. The owners of capital max-
imize quasi-rent from capital by hiring labor while the owners of labor maximize
earnings by allocating labor hours in the two sectors over time.
The general framework is analyzed in a two-period nite horizon model and
an innite period horizon model to determine potential property rights regimes
adopted by the community. In both models, two externalities inuence the choice
of property rights regimes chosen by the community: the crowding out e¤ect and
the stock e¤ect. In the two-period nite horizon model, the resource stock may
be kept open to non-community members during any period. The marginal gains
from keeping the resource stock open are equal to the increase in wage in the
manufacturing sector plus the gains in preserved stock by crowding out harvest
by other community members. If the marginal gains of allowing entrance are
greater than the marginal cost, some non-community members would be allowed
to enter the resource sector. When we analyze an innite horizon model, we
eliminate the possibility of a cyclical property rights regime pattern as an optimal
solution because of the ability of the community to internalize some of the stock
e¤ect in the future (see Chapter 2).
Trade policy e¤ects are introduced in two ways in the general equilibrium
model. First, we introduce an exogenous shock a¤ecting the terms of trade. In the
two-period model, the e¤ect of an announced opening to trade during the second
period leads to an increase in the resource stock prior to trade liberalization.
Once free trade is implemented, the resource stock may or may not decline in the
next period. However, in the innite horizon model, we nd that the equilibrium
long-run resource stock decreases given a permanent increase in the relative price
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in the resource sector. Thus, if the country can optimally select the property
rights regime governing the resource stock and follow the optimal dynamic path,
degrading the resource stock would lead to maximizing community welfare. It is
important to note that observing a decrease in stocks due to opening to trade is
not su¢ cient to conclude that the community maximizes welfare. The decline in
stock must follow the optimal dynamic path to ensure that welfare is maximized
(see Chapter 3).
The second way the trade policy e¤ects are introduced in the model is through
the government endogenously determining the trade policy in the presence of
various lobby groups within the economy. If only a single lobby group exists, the
lobby group can inuence the government to select a trade regime, free trade or
autarky, that maximizes their welfare as long as the political weight placed by the
government on lobby contributions are signicant. When two equally powerful
lobby groups exist, the lobby group with policy preferences that maximize social
welfare will lobby in order to ensure that its preferred trade regime is chosen.
We also analyze the e¤ect of an endogenous tari¤ rate in the political economy
model. We nd that the optimal tari¤ rate protecting a particular sector should
vary over time and depends upon the contributions received by the government,
marginal returns from the tari¤ as well as the marginal impact of the tari¤ on
the resource stock. Similar to the baseline innite horizon model, we derive the
same potential property rights regime patterns when tari¤ rates are endgoenous
(see Chapter 4).
A dynamic common property resource laboratory experiment was designed
to determine the decision rules a¤ecting labor allocation decisions and property
rights regime patterns; and to determine the e¤ect of trade on the resource stock.
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We nd that labor allocation decisions and the choice of property rights regimes
do not follow the optimal dynamic equilibrium path. The initial choice during
the rst few rounds, have a signicant e¤ect on future choices. If subjects start
with the wrong choices in the initial round, they would never reach the optimal
path. Furthermore, groups have been found to increase the stock prior to the price
increase in the future round and degrade the resource stock once the price increase
is in e¤ect. This behavior does seem to indicate that subjects do internalize some
of the stock e¤ect over time but they are on a non-optimal dynamic path because
they choose the wrong labor allocations in the rst few round (see Chapter 5).
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Two-Sector General Equilibrium
Model
A two-sector general equilibrium model is developed that incorporates an en-
dogenous change in the property rights regime governing the use of a dynamic
resource stock. This model adapts the Ricardo-Viner model commonly used in
analyzing international trade. Jacob Viner (1937) rst examined the specic fac-
tors model, a variation of the Ricardian model that allows for diminishing returns
to a mobile input as output increases. The model was popularized by Jones (1971)
and Samuelson (1971), while Mussa (1974) developed the well-known graphical
results from the model. The Ricardo-Viner model is a type of specic factors
model where there are two sectors and three inputs. Two of the inputs are xed
and specic to the two sectors while a third input is mobile.
In the rst section of this chapter, the basic structure of the model is pre-
sented. Then, the optimal property rights regime patterns governing the use of
the resource stock are determined under three scenarios: two-period model with
homogeneous community members; two-period model with heterogeneous com-




The two sectors in the economy are the manufacturing sector and the resource
sector. There are three factor endowments available in the economy. The manu-
facturing sector and the resource sector are endowed with capital and a resource
stock, respectively; while labor is a mobile input that can be used in either sector.
One unit of labor is interpreted as an hour of hired labor in the manufacturing
sector or an hour devoted to harvesting in the resource sector. From this point
forward, the terms community and non-community refer to the two main sources
of labor. Community members have de facto property rights to the resource
stock while non-community members do not. That is, the level of labor that
can be allocated by non-community members to the resource sector is subject to
direct control by the community members. The distribution of community and
non-community members are exogenously determined. Labor allocated at time t
in the resource sector and the manufacturing sector by the community member
is represented by lct and lct, respectively. Also, labor allocated at time t in the
resource sector and the manufacturing sector by the non-community member
is denoted by lnt and lnt, respectively. The maximum available labor hours at
time t for any individual is h. The total number of community members and
non-community members are C and N , respectively. We assume in most of our
analysis that C = N:
Production in the manufacturing sector at time t is characterized by an in-
creasing, concave, constant returns production function, Yx(K;Lxt) where Lxt is
the total labor allocated at time t in the manufacturing sector and K is capital
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endowment in the manufacturing sector. Here, total labor allocated in the manu-








nt. The objective of the owners
of capital at period t is to maximize quasi-rent from capital, rt, by optimally
choosing labor given a market wage rate at time t, wt. Normalizing output price
to 1 results in the following objective function,
max
Lxt
rt = Yx(K;Lxt)  wtLxt: (2.1)




At each time, the value of marginal product is equal to the equilibrium wage rate.
The resource sector is initially characterized as an open access resource with
no single owner. Entrants into the sector, who devote a positive amount of e¤ort,
derive earnings from harvest. E¤ort is a function, f , which captures partial
returns from the resource sector given own labor and labor from other entrants
into the sector. Assuming that the harvest per unit e¤ort is directly proportional
to the stock, the harvest, H, for the jth individual at time t can be expressed as
(Clark, 1985),
Hj(St; L jt; ljt) = jStf(L jt; ljt); (2.3)
where f(L jt; ljt) : D ! [0; 1j ] is continuously di¤erentiable. Here, D are labor
hours in the domain, j is the harvestability coe¢ cient of the jth individual, St is
the resource stock at time t, ljt is the labor devoted by the jth individual at time
t, and L jt is the summation of all labor hours devoted by other individuals at










i6=n lit. Total harvest
is nondecreasing in the stock and if there is no stock, harvest is zero. The e¤ort
function by the jth individual is assumed to be f(L jt; 0) = 0, @f(L jt; ljt)=@ljt 
0, and @2f(L jt; ljt)=@l2jt  0: Furthermore, we assume that @f(L jt; ljt)=@l jt 
0, @2f(L jt; ljt)=@l2 jt  0 and @2f(L jt; ljt)=@ljt@l jt  0 where l jt 2 L jt
representing labor from an individual other than j at time t.
Given the common-property nature of the resource stock, two types of exter-
nalities are examined: a crowding out e¤ect during each period, @Hj=@l jt, and
a stock e¤ect across time, t+1@Hj=@ljt, where t+1 is the marginal user cost of
the resource stock at time t + 1. The marginal user cost of the resource stock
is derived from the costate variable in the dynamic optimization problem in the
next section. The crowding out e¤ect results from congestion when e¤ort applied
by other individuals interferes with the current harvest. The stock e¤ect refers
to the reduction in future harvest due to individuals ignoring the e¤ect that their
own action has on future stock productivity.
One critical assumption that is made throughout the analysis is that the
harvestability coe¢ cient of community members are always greater than non-
community members. The di¤erences arise from the inherent capabilities of com-
munity members to harvest given that they have had rights over the use of the
resource stock and have had more experience and developed more e¢ cient tech-
nologies to harvest. New entrants into the resource stock, such as non-community
members, would still have to develop their skills or acquire new technology to ex-
tract from the resource stock. In this way, the assumption made in this analysis
is be plausible.
Individuals allocate labor in either sector depending on their returns from
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each sector. A laborer from the resource sector can harvest from the resource
stock and is faced with the wage in the manufacturing sector as his opportunity
cost. Total income, Ijt, by the jth individual at time t can be shown as follows,
Ijt = wtl

jt + ptjStf(L jt; ljt) (2.4)
where pt is the price of the harvested output from the resource sector relative to
price of the output in the manufacturing sector at time t. Total wealth, Wj, by
the jth individual is the summation of discounted income from a starting period,










jt + ptjStf(L jt; ljt)

t (2.5)
where  is the discount factor.
The change in stock over time depends on the natural growth function of the
stock and harvest by all individuals from the community and non-community.
The stock dynamics are expressed as,







Here, St+1 St is the change of stock over time, G(St) is the natural growth func-
tion of stock when there is no harvest, and c and n are the harvestability coef-
cients of community and non-community members, respectively. Total harvest
does not exceed the available stock at any time t, i.e. St 
PC
c=1 cStf(L ct; lct)+PN
n=1 nStf(L nt; lnt). A steady state resource stock occurs when the natural
growth of the stock is equal to the harvested amount at a particular time, i.e.
G(St) =
PC




2.2 Endogenous Property Rights Regime
2.2.1 Theoretical Outline with Homogeneous Community
Members
This section investigates when the community, which has de facto rights to the
resource stock, will choose to close or keep the resource stock open to non-
community members. Results from this section provide a baseline for comparing
more realistic cases that examine endogenous changes in property rights regimes
through voting. Two property rights regimes are examined: limited open-access
and community-managed open-access. The former refers to entrance by any
community member and a limited number of non-community members into the
resource sector, where the limit is determined by community members. The latter
refers to entrance of community members only into the resource sector. Under
community-managed open access, even though non-community members are not
allowed into the resource sector, open access amongst community members still
prevails. To simplify the analysis, assume that there is no cost of enforcement.
Perfect information among all players and perfect foresight are assumed in this
analysis. The equilibrium concept is Nash.1 It gives the set of labor hours and
wage rate in all periods that maximizes earnings for each individual while taking
the behavior of all other individuals as given. The optimal Nash strategy solution
is assumed to follow an open loop solution. The optimal open loop strategy for
1Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (1990) conducted a common pool resource laboratory exper-
iment to test if Nash equilibrium is a good predictor of behavior. They found that aggregate
groups do follow a Nash equilibrium pattern in some treatments (see Chapter 5 for a more in
depth discussion of the common pool resource experimental literature).
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a subject shows that the labor allocation in the two sectors during each period
of the economy are contingent upon the initial stock, termination time and the
current period. This implies that all community members must simultaneously
commit to a particular strategy during the initial period and follow it through
the entire game. Subjects do not adjust their strategy based on their observation
of the current stock level nor do they receive any new information during the
planning horizon (Amir and Nannerup, 2004).
In this baseline model, community members live a nite period of time and
only care about their own welfare over this period. To simplify our analysis,
we assume that there are only two periods with community members and non-
community members having harvestability coe¢ cients c and n, respectively,
where c > n. The objective of each community member is to maximize own
earnings over two periods given the stock dynamics. Community members are
only endowed with their own labor, which they can allocate in either the resource
sector or the manufacturing sector. Community members can earn a wage rate
from the manufacturing sector or the value of their harvest from the resource
stock. However, since community members also have de facto property rights
over the use of the resource stock, they also choose the amount of labor that
non-community members are allowed to use within the resource sector. Thus,
a community member chooses the amount of labor allocated in both sectors in
each period, lc0; l

c1; lc0; and lc1; and the amount of non-community labor, ln0;and
ln1; allowed into the resource sector in both periods. In order to ensure that
non-community members enter into the resource sector whenever lnt is o¤ered by
community members, the value of marginal product of non-community members







: Using equations (2:5) and (2:6) and assuming homoge-
neous community members, the maximization problem of the representative cth










ct + ptcStf(L ct; lct))
t
s:t: S1 = S0 +G(S0)  CcS0f(L c0; lc0) NnS0f(L n0; ln0); lct + lct = h;




n=1 ln0; and L n0 =
PC
c=1 lc0+PN
i6=n li0. By substituting S1 from the stock dynamics and l

ct from the labor con-
straint into the objective function, the community members objective function






(wt(h  lct) + ptcStf(L ct; lct))t; (2.7)
where S1 = S0+G(S0) CcS0f(L c0; lc0) NnS0f(L n0; ln0). The community
members problem is reduced to that of optimally choosing his/her own and non-
community labor allocations in the resource sector.
The owners of capital in the manufacturing sector maximize quasi-rent from
capital by optimally choosing labor as shown in equation (2.1). The Nash equilib-
rium wage rate is endogenously determined during both periods t.2 More (less)
labor in the manufacturing sector decreases (increases) the value of marginal
product of labor, consequently, (increasing) lowering the equilibrium wage. How-
2The equilibrium wage is assumed to be endogenously determined from a competitive mar-
ket. However, the output price is assumed to be exogenous for this exercise. The presence of
close substitutes to the resource based output justies this assumption.
20
ever, from the community members point of view, wage is exogenous because no
single individual can inuence the wage rate.
Equation (2.2) shows the necessary condition for quasi-rent maximization.
By substituting wt using (2.2) into the rst-order conditions from the community




















































Here, 1  p1cf(L c1; lc1) is the marginal user cost or the shadow price of
the resource stock. The shadow price of the resource stock is the "implicit" or
"planning" price that a stock, as a productive input, will take if labor is optimally
allocated over time.
21
Simultaneously solving for equation (2.8) to (2.11) along with the market
clearing conditions during each time, lct + lct = h and lnt + l

nt = h; will yield
the Nash equilibrium values for labor devoted by each individual as well as the
optimum wage rate. Given the assumption that all community members have the
same harvesting coe¢ cient, a symmetric Nash equilibrium is derived where all the
labor decisions within the community are the same. In order to ensure that we
have derived a local maximum, the second order conditions associated with the
model must be satised. Suppose that xsatises the necessary conditions in our
general equilibrium problem. A local maximum is achieved if the determinants
of principal minors of the Hessian evaluated at x alternate in sign. The Hessian









































, as the last element of the principal diagonal as, H1. If we




, we derive another principal minor calledH2:With these notations,
we can denote the conditions needed to ensure a maximum. If the sign of the
determinants of the principal minors alternate in sign, then we derive a maximum,
i.e. det jH1j > 0, det jH2j < 0, and det jHj > 0.
The interpretation of equations (2.8) and (2.9) is straightforward and mani-
3See Appendix A.1 for formulas derived for second order conditions.
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fests the optimal conditions for labor allocation in a Ricardo-Viner Model. Equa-
tion (2.9) tells us that if an interior solution exists, the optimal labor allocation
is satised when the values of marginal product in both sectors are equal during
the second period. Because individuals live only until the second period, they do
not internalize the stock e¤ect nor the crowding out e¤ect of other individuals.4
From (2.8) we see that during the rst period, the value of marginal product in
the manufacturing sector is equal to the value of marginal product in the resource
sector minus the marginal crowding out e¤ect of non-community members. Here,
the value of marginal product from the resource sector is adjusted for the stock
e¤ect from all entrants into the resource sector during the rst period. Thus,
we see that community members partially internalize the stock e¤ect and the
crowding out e¤ect over the two-period horizon model.
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) show the marginal contribution of non-community
labor to the income of the representative community member. If the represen-
tative community member earns negative marginal returns from the inclusion of
non-community members into the resource sector, the representative community
member would prefer to close the resource sector to non-community members.
The community members would always opt to close o¤ the resource stock during
the second period since their returns from allowing non-community labor is always
negative as shown in (2.11). During the rst period, increasing non-community
labor crowds out some harvest by the community. The community member in-
4If we solve for the social planners problem, the crowding out e¤ect and stock e¤ect will
fall out from the model. In this case, the social planner can employ instruments, such as a
Pigouvian tax, to capture all the rent from the resource stock. However, for the purposes of
this study, the focus is only on the endogenous choice of the community to keep the resource
stock open or closed.
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ternalizes some of the crowding out e¤ect from the entrance of non-community
members as shown by the positive e¤ect on community earnings from the second
term in (2.10),  1cS0C
@f(L c0;lc0)
@ln0
. Allowing entrance of non-community labor
in the rst period decreases marginal returns for all entrants into the resource
sector. Because the crowding out e¤ect is internalized by community members,
they are willing to shift labor from the resource sector to the manufacturing sec-
tor. Less pressure is put on the resource stock and may result in more stock
available for future harvest. Thus, allowing non-community members into the
resource stock in the rst period results increasing future benets in the form
of more resource stock in the next period. Whenever these marginal gains of
allowing entrance into the resource sector is larger than the marginal cost, the
community will open the resource sector.5 The critical assumption that leads to a
potential opening of the resource stock in the second period is the di¤erence in the
harvestability coe¢ cient between community and non-community members. The
assumption stating that community members have a higher harvestability coe¢ -
cient than non-community members is a necessary condition that would lead to
opening the resource sector. In this two-period general equilibrium model, there
are two property rights regime patterns that emerge: closed during both periods,
and open in the rst period and then closed in the last period.
5A simple mechanism that allows a limited amount of non-community members is a freely-
distributed capped permit system for non-community members.
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2.2.2 Numerical Example with Homogeneous Community
Members
We prove that opening the resource stock during the rst period can be an op-
timal decision by using a numerical example. Total labor endowment for each
individual in the economy, h, is equal to 10. Here, any community member or
non-community member can allocate at most 10 labor hours in the two sectors in
the economy. There are a total of 5 community members and 5 non-community
members, i.e. C = N = 5. The production function in the manufacturing sector
is specied to be quadratic in total labor hired and the capital is normalized to
1. Thus, the objective function faced by the owners of capital can be written as,
max
Lxt
Yx(Lxt) = aLxt   bLx2t   wtLxt;
where a and b are parameters of the production function. The optimal condition
that solves the problem of the owners of capital shows that the marginal product
of labor must equal the wage rate. From this, the variable wage during each time
period is derived to be,
wt = a  2bLxt:
The parameters a and b take the value of 400 and 2 respectively. Wage is non-
negative as long as a
2b
 Lxt and this assumption is satised given the parameters
chosen in the model. Since we have assumed that the maximum labor hours per
person is 10 and there are a total of 10 individuals in the economy, the maximum
number of labor hours allowed in the manufacturing sector can only be 100. Given




= 100  100 = maxLxt.
The production function for entrants into the resource sector follows the same




. This e¤ort function depends on the total labor in the resource sector, Lrt;
as well as a proportion of own labor relative, ljt; to total labor in the resource
sector. This simplies to Lrtljt where    1   < 0. The harvest from the
resource sector is expressed as,
Hj(St; Ljt; ljt) = jStL

rtljt;
where  takes a value of -0.5;  for community members and non-community





Whenever the amount of own labor in the resource sector is equal to zero, the
harvest is zero as well. Furthermore, a marginal increase in own labor results




rt ljt): For the marginal
change in stock to be positive, it must be the case that, (Lrt + L
 1






: The largest possible value of ljt
Lrt
is equal to 1 but   1

= 2,
thus, this conditions holds. The crowding out e¤ect of all other individuals on
own labor is equal to StL
 1
rt ljt < 0: The value of harvest is equal to H
j
multiplied by the relative price, p and is equal to 30. The discount factor  is
0.90.
The stock in the next period is equal to the net growth of the stock during the
initial period plus the initial stock, S0 minus all the harvest by all individuals.
The net growth funtion, G(St), indicates the net biological growth in the stock
as a function of the current available stock. We assume that the net growth





where e is the
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intrinsic growth rate of the stock and f is the natural carrying capacity. The
growth rate of the stock is monotonically decreasing in the stock. Furthermore,
the maximum sustainable yield of the stock is equal to f
2
: The parameters used
here are f = 80, e = 0:60 and an initial stock, S0 = 65: The equation denoting












Using equations (2.8) to (2.11), we derive two potential optimal labor alloca-
tion in the resource sector, lc0 and lc1, and the optimal number of non-community
labor in the resource sector, ln0 and ln1, during both periods. The two poten-
tial optimal solution sets flc0; lc1; ln0; ln1g are f0:409; 1:685; 2:988; 0g and f0;
2:222; 0; 2:488g: To determine the solution set that yields a local maximum, we
derive the determinant of the principal minors evaluated at these values. We
nd that the rst solution set yields alternating signs, where det jH1j = 461 > 0,
det jH2j =  9573 < 0, and det jH j = 21309 > 0.6 However, the determinants of
the principal minors in the second solution set does not yield alternating signs
implying that this is a saddle point.7
Thus, the optimal labor allocation by community members during the rst
period and second period are, 0.409 and 1.685, respectively. The amount of non-
community labor allowed by community members are 2.988 and 0 during the
rst and second periods, respectively. Non-community members would have an
incentive to enter into the resource sector since their value of marginal product
6Appendix A.1 shows the elements of the Hessian evaluated at the optimal values.
7The determinants of the prinicipal minors were found to be det
H1 =  3942:1 > 0,
det
H2 =  40338:8 < 0, and det jH j = 122403 > 0.
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in that sector evaluated at 2.988 is 67.95 while the wage is 43.15. By allowing
2.988 units of non-community labor to enter into the resource sector, the marginal








, is approximately 191. Hence, the level of entrance of
1.685 units of non-community labor during the rst period equates the marginal
cost and marginal benets from allowing entrance into the resource sector during
the rst period.
2.3 Endogenous Property Rights and Majority
Voting
2.3.1 Theoretical Outline with Heterogeneous Commu-
nity Members
The preceding section examined how a community composed of homogeneous
members decide to close or keep a resource stock open to non-community mem-
bers. In this section, the focus is turned to the implementation of the property
rights regime for a community of heterogenous members. Assume that com-
munity members di¤er and are ranked according to their extraction e¢ ciency,
while non-community members remain homogeneous with a harvestability coef-
cient, n. The harvestability coe¢ cient is ranked from lowest to highest for all
C community members such that, c1 < c2 < : : : < cm < : : : < cC 1 < cC
where subscripts on c denote the rank of the community member. Here, the Cth
individual is the most e¢ cient, with a harvestability coe¢ cient cC , while the
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1st individual is the least e¢ cient, with a harvestability coe¢ cient c1. The mth
individual is called the median voter and has a harvestability coe¢ cient cm. Fur-
themore, it is assumed that c1 > n. From this analysis, the optimal property
rights regime pattern implemented through a majority voting rule is derived.
Under a majority voting rule, the median voters preference determines the
outcome. If the median voter earns more welfare by keeping the resource sector
open (closed) to non-community members, the community will vote to (dis)allow
entrance into the resource sector. The equilibrium concept is again an open loop
Nash equilibrium strategy. The median voters objective is to maximize wealth
over two periods by allocating labor in both sectors in each period, lm0; l

m1;
lm0; and lm1: He also selects the amount of non-community labor, ln0;and ln1;
allowed into the resource sector in both periods based on the majority voting
rule. In order to ensure that non-community members enter into the resource
sector whenever lnt is o¤ered by median voter, the value of marginal product of
non-community members evaluated at lnt must be greater than or equal to the
















mt + ptcmStf(L mt; lmt))
t
s:t: S1 = S0 +G(S0) 
CX
i=1




where lmt and lmt is the amount of labor allocated by the median voter in
the resource sector and manufacturing sector at time t, respectively; L mt =
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PC
c 6=m lct + Nlnt; L c0 =
PC
i6=c li0 + Nln0, and L n0 =
PC
i=1 li0 + (N   1)ln0: By
substituting S1 from the stock dynamics and lmt from the labor constraint into






(wt(h  lmt) + ptcmStf(L mt; lmt))t (2.13)









The median voters problem is reduced to that of optimally choosing his own labor
and non-community labor allocations in the resource sector. Other community
members have similar objective functions but the subscript m is replaced by the
subscript for the cth community member.
The owners of capital in the manufacturing sector maximize quasi-rent from
capital by choosing the amount of labor employed as shown in (2.1). Equation
(2.2) shows the necessary condition for quasi-rent maximization.
By substituting for wt using (2.2) into the rst-order conditions from the


































































Here, 1  p1mf(L m1; lm1) is the marginal user cost of the resource stock for
the median voter.
There are C   1 similar rst order conditions as (2.14) and (2.15) from the
maximization problem of the other community members except themth subscript
would each be replaced with the cth subscript. Simultaneously solving for labor
allocated in the resource sector using all 2C+2 conditions along with the market
clearing conditions during each time, lct + lct = h and lnt + l

nt = h; yields the
Nash equilibrium allocation of labor and the optimum wage rate. The second-
order conditions here are similar to that in the homogeneous community member























































































Denote the principal minor containing @
2Wj
@l2c1;1
, as the last element of the prin-
cipal diagonal as, H1c . If we include one more column and one more row such
that the last principal diagonal contains, @
2Wj
@l2c2;0
, we derive another principal mi-
nor called H2c : If we continue for all C community members along with the two
non-community member decisions, there are (C   1) + 2 principal minors. With
these notations, we can denote the conditions needed to ensure a maximum. If
the sign of the determinants of the principal minors alternate, then we derive a
maximum. Thus, det jH1c j > 0; det jH2c j < 0; ::::evaluated at the optimal values
shows that the optimal values are a local maximum.
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) tell us that the median voter allocates labor be-
tween the two sectors of the economy until the value of marginal product between
the two sectors are equal. Like the previous case where all individuals are ho-
mogenous, the median voter does not internalize either the crowding out e¤ect
nor the stock e¤ect during the last period. However, the median voter does
partially internalize some of the stock e¤ect and crowding out e¤ect during the
rst period. Other community members face similar conditions when deciding to
allocate labor between the two sectors.
Again, the stock e¤ect and the crowding out e¤ect play an important role in
determining the Nash equilibrium sequence of property rights regime. Equations
(2.16) and (2.17) show the marginal returns to the income of the median voter
for a marginal increase in non-community labor in the resource sector. These
equations reect the median voters preferences. The community will always vote
to close the stock in the last period. Similarly, from (2.16), the median voter may
or may not prefer to close the resource stock in the rst period. Allowing non-
community labor into the resource stock crowds out the harvest for all entrants
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into the resource stock. This results in a shift in labor allocation from the resource
sector to the manufacturing sector. If the amount of stock preserved through
the crowding out of community members is su¢ ciently large, the median voter
would allow non-community labor to enter the resource sector. The necessary
assumption that allows for this result to occur is that the harvestability coe¢ cient
of the non-community members is lower than the harvestability coe¢ cient of the
lowest ranked community member. This particular assumption allows for more
preservation of the stock per unit of community labor replaced by non-community
labor.
2.3.2 Numerical Example with Heterogeneous Commu-
nity Members
This numerical example shows a case where opening the resource stock during the
rst period is an optimal decision. Similar to the previous numerical example,
the total labor endowment for each individual economy, h, is equal to 10. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that there are a total of 3 community members
and 3 non-community members, i.e. C = N = 3. We continue to assume that
the production function follows a quadratic formulation,
max
Lxt
Yx(Lxt) = aLxt   bLx2t   wtLxt;
where a and b are parameters of the production function. The optimal condition
that solves the problem of the owners of capital shows that the marginal product
of labor must equal the wage rate,
wt = a  2bLxt:
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The parameters a and b take the value of 240 and 2 respectively. Wage
is non-negative as long as a
2b
 Lxt and this assumption is satised given the
parameters chosen in the model. Since we have assumed that the maximum
labor hours per person is 10 and there are a total of 6 individuals in the economy,
the non-negativity constraint on wage holds.
We continue to assume the same harvest function in the resource sector,
Hj(St; Ljt; ljt) = jStL

rtljt;
where  takes a value of -0.5. Since  does not change, the marginal product is
strictly positive while the crowding out e¤ect is negative as before. The harvest-
ing coe¢ cient  for non-community members remain at 0.1, but the harvesting
coe¢ cient of the three community members are equal to 0.51, 0.50 and 0.49. The
value of harvest is equal to Hj multiplied by the relative price, p and is equal to
13.
Similar to the previous example, the stock in the next period is equal to the
net growth of the stock during the initial period plus the initial stock, S0 minus
all the harvest by all individuals. We continue to assume that the net growth





where f = 80,
e = 0:60 and an initial stock, S0 = 66: The equation denoting the available stock












We derive the optimal values for the three community members during both
time periods as well as the amount of non-community members using equations
(2.14) to (2.17). The optimal values are summarized in Table 2.1.
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Time Period Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Non-community
1 0.013 0.151 0.152 2.420
2 0.116 2.805 3.868 0.000
Table 2.1: Optimal Labor Allocations in Two-Period Finite Model with Hetero-
geneous Community Members
The amount of labor allocated by community members are increasing in the
harvesting e¢ ciency. Less labor is allocated in the resource sector during the
rst period while non-community members are allowed into the resource sector
but none in the last period. Allowing 2.42 units of non-community labor into the
resource sector yields a value of marginal product of 55.78 in the resource sector
while the prevailing wage is 20.98. Thus, non-community members would be
willing to enter into the sector. To test if this solution is a maximum, we derive
the determinants of the principal minors. Here, we nd that det jH1c j = 398:5 > 0,
det jH2c j =  5649:9 < 0, det jH3c j = 89609:5 > 0; det jH4c j =  1:07  106 <
0; det jH5c j = 1:02  107; det jH6c j =  1:72  108 < 0; and det jHcj = 3:57  108 >
0.8 Therefore, we nd that the set of optimal values from Table 2.1 is a local
maximum.9
Given the results from the baseline homogeneous community case, this out-
come is not unexpected in the heterogenous community case. The voting equi-
librium is counterintuitive since we would not expect the community to keep
the resource stock open to non-community members. This may occur as long
8Appendix A.2 shows the elements of the Hessian evaluated at the optimal values.
9An alternative set of solutions were derived where fl10; l11; l20; l21; l30; l31; ln0; ln1g =
f0; 0; 0; 2:11; 0; 4:77; 2:27; 0g: However, the determinants of the principal minors do not alternate
in sign indicating that this is a saddle point.
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as the marginal gains from allowing entrance into the resource sector, i.e., in-
crease in stock from the crowding out e¤ect, are greater than the marginal cost.
Intuitively, this particular mechanism is a means of regulating the open access
problem within the community itself, in the absence of any formal regulatory
measure.
2.4 Endogenous Property Rights in an Innite
Horizon Model
So far, it was assumed that individuals live for a nite number of periods. In
reality, older generations may care about the welfare of future generations.10 This
section derives the equilibrium property rights regime patterns when a community
comprised of homogeneous members live forever and maximizes their wealth over
time.
The open loop Nash equilibrium solution is derived in the innite horizon
model. It gives a set of labor hours and a wage rate that maximizes earnings
for all community members while taking the behavior of all other individuals as
given during each period. To fully derive the solution to this general equilibrium,
it is assumed that owners of each specic factor have perfect information and
perfect foresight in the future. Furthermore, it is assumed that from the point of
view of an individual, one person cannot a¤ect the wage rate, thus all providers
of labor take the wage as given.
10Positive bequest values have been found associated with preservation of the environment
and resource stocks. Krutilla (1967) initially laid down the foundation for environmental preser-
vation for the benet of the future.
36
We also make some assumptions on the magnitude of the rst derivative and
second derivatives in the e¤ort function. The absolute value of the change in
e¤ort level from own labor of the jth individual is greater than the change in
e¤ort due to other labor,
@f(L jt;ljt)@ljt   @f(L jt;ljt)@l jt . Specic assumptions of
the magnitude of the e¤ort function of community and non-community mem-
bers are also made. Recall that the harvesting coe¢ cients for the cth and nth
community member as c and n, respectively while their e¤ort functions are













> 0 . Lastly, we assume @G(0)
@(St)
 Ccf(L ct; lct)+
Nanf(L nt; lnt): This implies that the intrinsic growth rate of the stock is less
than or equal to the marginal change in total harvest given a change in stock.
Similar to the two-period model, we assume that the value of marginal product
of non-community members evaluated at the amount of labor allowed by com-







The owners of capital maximize quasi-rent from capital by optimally choosing




rt = Yx(K;Lxt)  wtLxt 8 t = 0; 1; :::;1 :
The rst-order condition that determines the optimal value during each time




At each time, the value of marginal product is equal to the equilibrium wage rate.
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Let us assume that all community members and non-community members are
homogeneous with harvestability coe¢ cients c and n, respectively, such that
c > n. The problem faced by the representative community member is to
maximize wealth subject to the dynamic resource stock and labor constraints.
The representative community member chooses labor allocated in both sectors
of the economy as well as non-community labor allowed into the resource sector
in every period. The maximization problem of the representative community








ct + pcStf(L ct; lct))
t
s:t: St+1 St = G(St) CcStf(L ct; lct) NnStf(L nt; lnt);S(0) = S0; lct+lct = h;
By substituting the labor constraint into the objective function, the dynamic






(wt(h  lct) + pcStf(L ct; lct))t (2.20)
s:t: St+1 St = G(St) CcStf(L ct; lct) NnStf(L nt; lnt); S(0) = S0; lct+lct = h;
A few comments on the maximization problem above are in order. The stock
dynamics are a generalization of the stock transition in the two-period models.
As stated earlier, the problem follows an innite planning horizon so that the
representative community member accumulates wealth from allocating labor into
the two sectors of the economy during his lifetime as well as from the discounted
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labor allocation decisions of future descendants. The discrete innite horizon
formulation does not alter the fundamental results of the model but is used for
analytical simplicity. Furthermore, the maximization above also implies that the
representative community members decisions follow an optimal plan formulated
in the base period given the initial parameters of the model. Lastly, we do not
address the problems of uncertainty, thus, the results of the analysis may change
upon the introduction of risk posture of community members in the model.
The current-value Hamiltonian is written as,
H = wt(h lct)+pcStf(L ct; lct)+t+1 (G(St)  CcStf(L ct; lct) NnStf(L nt; lnt)) :
where t+1 is the costate variable associated with the resource stock. The costate
variable is the current value of the marginal user cost of the resource stock at
time t + 1. The maximum labor allocated by the community member in the
resource sector is h. Also, the minimum labor by non-community members in the
resource sector is zero. We focus on these two constraints since we are interested
in analyzing cases where full closure of the resource stock to non-community
members and complete specialization of community members in the resource
sector occurs.11 The Lagrangean can be written as,
L = H + t(h  lct) + tlnt;
where t and t are multipliers for the constraints on the control variables.
11The other constraints in this model are to allow for lnt = h and lct = 0: However, this
would only introduce more complexity into the model without changing the basic results of the
analysis.
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By substituting wt using (2.19) into the rst order conditions from the rep-














(h  lct) @L@lct = 0;
@L
@t

















= lnt > 0; lntt = 0; (2.24)
t+1 t = (1 )t+1 t+1(G(St) Ccf(L ct; lct) Nnf(L nt; lnt)) pcf(L ct; lct);
(2.25)
St+1   St = G(St)  CcStf(L ct; lct) NncStf(L nt; lnt); (2.26)
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From equation (2.21), community members allocate labor between the two
sectors at time t until the value of marginal product in the manufacturing sector
is equal to the value of marginal product from the resource sector minus the
shadow value of the resource stock and the crowding out e¤ect of non-community
members. If the marginal return from labor allocated in the resource sector is
greater than the returns in the manufacturing sector, the community member
allocates all labor into the resource sector. Equation (2.23) shows the marginal
contribution of non-community labor to income at time t. If the contribution of
non-community labor to the Lagrangean is negative, the community will close
the resource stock. However, if the gain in income from crowding out some
community labor is large enough, community members may keep the resource
stock open during that period. It is important to reiterate that the necessary
condition that allows us to derive this result is the relatively higher harvestability
coe¢ cient of community members compared to non-community members.
In order to derive the Nash equilibrium in this dynamic general equilibrium
framework, the phase space and the associated regions of the constraints on the
control variables are examined. Since there are two control variables, the phase
plane in the state and co-state space are derived. To build the phase diagram,
we rst divide the phase space into regions where the constraints on the control
variables bind or not, i.e. lnt  0 and lct  h: Then, we derive the isoclines within
each region of the phase diagram. Lastly, we analyze the stability properties of
any steady state solution that are found.
First, we derive the equation that divides the regions where non-community
labor is greater than or equal to zero. Let us dene the discounted marginal user
value of the stock at time t as t  t+1. Whenever t > 0, non-community
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labor is zero, lnt = 0. Using equation (2.23) along with our denition for t, we













Dene the right-hand-side of this inequality as  t(St): Any value of t greater
than or equal to  t(St) implies non-community labor is equal to zero. In order
to illustrate the region in the phase space where non-community labor is equal
to zero as opposed to strictly greater than zero, we draw the function  t(St) in
state and costate space. Taking the rst and second derivative of  t(St) with




























 0 and @
2 t
@S2t
 0: Thus, the function  t(St) is convex and decreas-
ing in the stock. The region above  t implies that non-community labor is equal
to zero. When t is equal to zero, non-community labor is positive and this is
depicted by the region below  t (see Figure 2.1).
In order to delineate the regions where community labor is at the constraint,
h, or less than h, we look at equation (2.21). Whenever t > 0, labor by the
representative community member is equal to h. Using equation (2.21) along

















Dene the right hand side of the inequality as $t(St). Any value of t greater
than or equal to $t(St) implies community labor is equal to h. To illustrate the
region in the phase space where community labor is equal to h as opposed to less
than h, we draw the function $t(St) in state and costate space. Taking the rst































Therefore, the function $t(St) is concave and increasing in St: The region above
$t implies community labor is equal to h while the remaining region below $t
shows community labor less than h (Figure 2.1).
By combining both  t and $t; we are able to delineate the four regions in the
phase diagram: (1) an interior solution exists for both controls (lnt > 0; lct < h);
(2) an interior solution exists for own labor and the resource sector is fully closed
(lnt = 0; lct < h); (3) an interior solution exists for non-community labor but
the representative community member devotes all labor into the resource sector
(lnt > 0; lct = h); and (4) the representative community member fully specializes
in the resource sector and votes to close it o¤to non-community members (lnt = 0;
lct = h) (see Figure 2.1). If there is an abundance of resource stock and marginal
user cost is relatively large, the community votes to keep out non-community




lnt = 0, lct < h
lnt = 0, lct = h
lnt > 0, lct = h
lnt > 0, lct < h
ϖt
t
Figure 2.1: Regions in the Phase Diagram
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user cost and resource stocks, the community allows entrance into the resource
stock (as shown by the area below  t). The derivation of the S and  isoclines
proceeds region by region.
The optimal trajectories for the state and control variables are found as the
solution to the following equations based on the maximum principle,
(lct; lnt) = argmaxL; (2.27)










TST+1 = 0: (2.30)
We derive the Hessian of the Lagrangean as negative semi-denite, which
implies that the determinant of the Hessian is non-negative and the diagonal ele-








 0; and @lnt
@St
 0: (2.31)
From the comparative statics in (2.31), as the shadow value of the resource
stock increases, the representative community member allocates less labor and
allows less non-community labor in the resource sector. Also, any increase in
stock will lead to non-decreasing community and non-community labor, ceteris
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paribus. These results are needed to obtain the isoclines in each region of the
phase plane.
In order to derive the isocline and trajectories, we utilize equations (2.27) to
(2.29). We start by deriving the isoclines for the stock and its shadow value when
an interior solution exists in both of the control variables (see Appendix B.2 for
a complete derivation of the isoclines in each region). The S and  isoclines can
be derived by assuming that the change in S and  over time is zero, i.e. 0 = @L
@t
and 0 = (1  )t   @L@St , respectively. Using the implicit function theorem along
with comparative statics above, we derive a positive slope for the S isocline and
negative slope for the  isocline when the optimal control variables are interior
solutions. The S and  isoclines are also positively sloped and negatively sloped,
respectively, in the regions where lct < h and lnt = 0; and lct = h and lnt > 0.12
However, when lct = h and lnt = 0; the S isocline is vertical while the  isocline
remains downward sloping.
The co-state and state isoclines are the steady-state solutions for equations
(2.28) and (2.29). The whole system is in a steady state if the change in the
optimal value of the Lagrangean due to a change in resource stock equals the
discounted current value of the co-state. Using equations (2.28) and (2.29) along
with the comparative statics from (2.31), we can illustrate a potential phase
diagram as shown in Figure 2.2. The -isocline is the long-run demand for the
resource stock while the S isocline is the long-run supply of the resource stock.
The steady-state values of the resource stock and shadow value are Seq and eq,
respectively. The unstable regions are: to the left of the S isocline and above the
12Since we have assumed that G0(0)  Ccf(L ct:lct) + Nnf(L nt:lnt), the S isocline is
monotonically increasing.
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 isocline; and to the right of the S isocline and below the  isocline. In these
regions, the system moves away from the steady state (see Appendix B.2 for the
derivation of the direction of motion in each region of the phase plane).
In Figure 2.2, the steady state is in the region where the community utilizes
all labor in the resource stock and close the resource stock to non-community
members. The heavy arrowed curve represents the converging separatrix. Given
a su¢ ciently large initial stock level, community members close o¤ the resource
sector in all time periods but do not initially allocate all labor into the resource
sector. The community specializes in the resource sector only when we get close
to the steady state equilbrium (see Appendix B.3 that proves the steady state
equilibrium is a saddle path).
In general, the optimal trajectory can be increasing from the lower right hand
region of the phase plane to the upper left hand region. Alternatively, the opti-
mal dynamic path can move from the upper left hand corner to the lower right
hand corner in the phase diagram. We can determine ve potential property
rights regimes that can occur over time in this trajectory (see Figure 2.3). Let
us take trajectory 4 as an example. Given a starting point of z, trajectory 4
follows a potential optimal path where the representative community member
initially votes to keep the resource sector closed but after some time, opens the
resource sector. Alternatively, there is also the potential to start o¤ at point z
on trajectory 3. Here, the representative community member initially keeps the
resource sector open but after some time, closes the resource sector. Sequences
of full closure and always opening resource stocks may occur as illustrated in
trajectories 1 and 2, respectively. Lastly, semi-cyclical patterns may arise as well








St+1 – St = 0
µt+1 – µt = 0
Figure 2.2: Adjustment Path and Steady State Values of Resource Stock and
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Figure 2.3: Potential Property Rights Regime Patterns in an Innite Horizon
Model
then open.13
Results from the this model eliminate full cyclical patterns of property rights
regime sequences as an optimal management scheme and harvesting solution.
In the context of shery management, cyclical harvesting strategies or chattering
strategies have been proven to be theoretically optimal (Lewis and Schmalensee, 1979;
Clark, 1985). This optimal harvest strategy is characterized by continuous en-
13If the optimal saddle path moves from the upper left hand region to the lower right hand
region, the same property rights regime sequences can occur in this trajectory.
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trance and exit of shermen. However, a chattering strategy as an optimal har-
vesting policy is driven by the assumption that the owners of the resource stock
have little or no capital costs in vessels, equipment and worker compensation
(Liski, et al., 2001). It may not be optimal for community members that have
rights over the resource stock to continually change their shing eet structure
due to the presence of adjustment costs. Furthermore, the property rights regime
patterns that eliminate continuous cycling as an optimal management strategy
is feasible given the non-cycling pattern of stock population over time. In this
model, the assumption of perfect foresight and internalization of the stock ef-
fect during the planning horizon eliminates the possibility of cycling of the stock
population and, consequently, cycling of the property rights regime pattern.
The phase diagram in Figure 2.2 assumes that the intrinsic growth rate of the
stock is less than the change in harvest for a given change in stock. However, if
this condition does not hold, the S isocline may become U-shaped. Because of
the change in the shape of the S isocline, multiple equilibria may occur. This
results in a potential phase diagram as shown in Figure 2.4.14 There are two
equilibria nodes, A and B. Node A has a stable saddle path going through it
while node B is an unstable equilbrium. In node A, the steady state stock level
is greater than in node B, but the steady state marginal user cost is greater in
node B than in node A. The only stable regions occur above the  isocline and
to the right of the S isocline, as well as the area bounded by the two isoclines.
Thus, with multiple equilbria, the unstable area is larger compared to a solution
with a single equilibrium point.
In this chapter, we derived the di¤erent potential property rights regimes









St+1 – St = 0
µt+1 – µt = 0
Figure 2.4: Adjustment Path with Multiple Equilibria
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governing the resource stock by using a dynamic two-sector general equilibrium
model. In a two-period nite horizon model, the community members may vote
to keep the resource stock open to some non-community members as long as the
marginal gains from opening the stock are greater than the marginal cost. The
marginal gains from allowing limited access to non-community members in this
model come from the increase in stock by crowding out community members
that have a greater impact on the stock when harvesting. Thus, four property
rights regimes sequences may occur: full closure during both periods, open in
both periods, close in the rst period and open in the last period, or open in the
rst period and close in the last period. The results from this type of mechanism
is similar to a tax. If the community planner sets a tax rate for all community
members equal to the marginal crowding out e¤ect, the outcome would be similar
to our property rights regime mechanism.
In the innite horizon model, we have shown ve property rights regime se-
quences that may exist. We have eliminated the potential for a cyclical property
rights regime as an optimal solution. As long as property rights regimes are well
dened and community members internalize the stock e¤ect over time, we will
no longer see cyclical patterns of opening and closing the resource stock.
In all three cases, the necessary assumption that allows for the potential to
keep the resource sector open is the higher harvestability coe¢ cient in the com-
munity relative to the non-community members. When a group of individuals
has rights over the use of a particular resource stock, it is not di¢ cult to imagine
that they would have better technology and have developed more skills relative to
non-owners. However, as skill levels converge and technologies are adapted across
individuals, the harvestability coe¢ cient gap may decrease over time and ulti-
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mately become insignicant. If this occurs, there will no longer be any incentive
to keep the resource sector open since one unit of labor from either the community
or non-community in the resource sector diminishes the same amount of stock.
Therefore, whenever the harvestability coe¢ cient of non-community members is
greater than or equal to that of community members, the stock will always be
kept closed.
Another assumption in the model is that wages are exogenous from the view-
point of an individual player in the economy. However, when unions are formed
in the manufacturing sector, their aggregate behavior allows wages to be endoge-
nous. If wages are treated endogenously, opening of the resource stock may also
occur in the rst round.
The open-loop strategy has been derived in this chapter. In a closed-loop
strategy solution, where subjects are allowed to condition their extraction level
on the current stock, the optimal harvesting strategy and property rights regime
choices will not be a¤ected as long as subjects have perfect foresight. Perfect
foresight implies that individuals will know the stock level over time. Thus, with
an open-loop strategy, where current stock levels are not observed, or a closed-
loop strategy, where current stock levels can be observed, the optimal choices of
labor and property rights regime do not di¤er.
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Chapter 3
Trade, Property Rights Regimes and Resource
Stocks
Recent protests during the World Trade Organization meetings have highlighted
concern over the progress of trade liberalization. An important issue has been
the fear of increased environmental degradation, especially in developing coun-
tries, due to the reduction in trade barriers. Trade policies can signicantly
a¤ect natural resource stocks through indirect links, such as endowments of nat-
ural resources, technological e¢ ciency, governing institutions, and property rights
regimes (Abler, et al., 1999; Antweiler, et al., 2001; Alpay, 2001; Bourgeon and López, 1999;
Brander and Taylor, 1997a and 1997b; Chichilnisky, 1994; Copeland and Taylor, 1994).
The model that we have developed implies that the e¤ect of trade on the resource
stock is through an indirect and direct channels. The direct channel shows the
change in the labor allotted to harvesting the resource stock due to an exogenous
change in output price from opening to trade. On the other hand, the indirect
e¤ect occurs when the community votes on a particular property rights regime.
Once the property rights regime is chosen, the community members reallocate
labor between the two sectors accordingly, thus inuencing the level of the re-
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source stock. In this chapter, the comparative statics in the nite horizon model
and comparative dynamics in the innite horizon model of opening to trade on
the resource stock are determined.
3.1 Comparative Statics in Finite HorizonModel
Opening a small economy to trade will result in a change in the relative domestic
price towards the prevailing world market price. Countries that have comparative
advantage (disadvantage) in the production of the resource-based output will see
an increase (decrease) in the relative price of the good. Using the two-period
homogeneous community model, we answer the question: how will an improve-
ment in the terms of trade during period 2 (increase in p1) a¤ect the resource
stock for a small open economy during the same period (period 2) and the period
after (period 3)? Based on our model, an exogenous change in the terms of trade
(p1) will have an e¤ect on the optimal labor allocation (lc0, lc1) of the repre-
sentative community member in the resource sector as well as on the amount of
non-community labor in both periods (ln0, ln1). An announced change in future
price can a¤ect the labor allocation decisions in the current period since individ-
uals may anticipate changing optimal plans formulated in the base period. Once
we derive the e¤ect of price on lct and lnt, we derive the impact of lct and lnt on
stock to get the the total e¤ect of price on stocks.
In obtaining the comparative statics needed to analyze the e¤ect of trade
openness on labor allocations, we rely on Topkis (1978) monotonicity theorem:
given a system of complements and a vector of complementary exogenous para-
meters, monotone shifts in the latter imply a monotone shift of the endogenous
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variables.1 Formally, a function F : RK ! R is said to be supermodular in z and
z0 in RK ! R, we have
F (z _ z0) + F (z ^ z0)  F (z) + F (z0); (3.1)
where z _ z0 is the coordinate-wise maximum of the points z and z0; i.e. z _ z0 =
(maxfz1; z01g; :::;maxfzm; z0mg); and z ^ z0 is the coordinate-wise minimum of the
points z and z0; i.e. z ^ z0 = (minfz1; z01g; :::;minfzm; z0mg): If F is smooth,
supermodularity is equivalent to the condition,
@2F
@zi@zj
 0 8 i 6= j: (3.2)
Thus, if all the cross-partial derivatives for any smooth function, along with
the parameter of interest, are non-negative, then there is an increasing relation-
ship between the parameter and the optimal choice.2
We apply the theorem to our two-period model. The cross partial derivatives
of the variables, f( lc0); lc1; ( ln0) ; ( ln1); p1g, from the objective function are








 0 and @ln1
@p1
 0: (3.3)
1Topkistheorem does not need to impose any assumptions on the concavity of the objection
function, interiority of the solution or convexity of the feasible set. See Topkis (1998) for a more
detailed examination of supermodularity and complementarity.
2Milgrom and Shannon (1994) developed the general theory of monotone comparative sta-
tics. They derived the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a solution set of an optimization
problem to be monotonic in the parameters of the problem.
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An improvement in the terms of trade during period 2 results in an increase
in the labor allocated in the resource stock by the representative community
member. Given an increase in the protability of harvesting from the resource
stock relative to working in the manufacturing industry, allocating more labor
into the resource sector during the second period results in an increase in wealth.
However, when an announced increase in the terms of trade occurs in period 2,
the representative community member anticipates this price change and tries to
preserve more of the resource stock for future harvest by decreasing own labor in
period 1.
An improvement in the terms of trade also a¤ects the communitys decision
to allow non-community labor into the resource sector. As expected, an increase
in the relative price from harvesting the resource stock in period 2 results in
limiting the entrance of non-community labor in the resource stock in period 2.
In period 1, the representative community member chooses to limit the number
of non-community entrants as well in order to preserve the resource stock prior to
opening to trade. This result is similar to Hotte, et al. (2000), where they show
that an increase in terms of trade results in more enforcement of property rights
regimes to derive higher returns from harvesting a resource.
To derive the impact of a change in price during period 2 on the available
stock in periods 2 and 3, we use the comparative statics from (3.3) along with
the transition equation of the stock in (2.6). The stock in period 2 can be written
as,







n0 are the optimal level of labor allocation in the
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Whenever the marginal e¤ort from own labor weighted by the harvesting
e¢ ciency parameter is greater than the marginal e¤ort from other labor weighted










> 0, the e¤ect of an
increase in price during period 2 increases the stock during the same period. In
order to increase the stock level during period 2, it is necessary to decrease labor
allocation and entrance of non-community members during the rst period.
However, the nal impact on the stock after the price e¤ect takes into place
is ambigous in the two-period model. Using (2.6), the stock in period 3 can be
written as,
S2 = S1 +G(S1)  CcS1f(L c1; lc1) NnS0f(L n1; ln1): (3.5)






























































































Three factors a¤ect the impact of stock levels during period 3 when prices
increase in period 2. Two factors increase the stock in the third period: the
natural growth rate of the stock, @G(S1)
@S1
; and the decrease in non-community
labor during period 2,@ln1
@p1
 0. However, the increased pressure from labor
allocations by community members degrade the resource stock, @lc1
@p1
 0. Overall,
the remaining stock after the third round may or may not immediately decrease
depending on the magnitude of the growth of the stock, property rights regime
choice and change in labor allocations by community members. Thus, when
we allow for a dynamic resource stock and endogenous property rights regime,
opening a country to trade does not necessarily imply an immediate degradation
of the resource stock in a two-period model.
3.2 Comparative Dynamics in Innite Horizon
Model
The e¤ect of opening to trade can be analyzed in the dynamic model. We return
to the innite horizon model from Chapter 2.4 to investigate the e¤ect of a
price increase, due to opening to trade, on resource stocks. If the economy has
comparative advantage in the production from the resource sector, opening to
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trade leads to an increase in the relative price of output from that sector. Here,
we determine the e¤ect of an increase in p on the long-run equilibrium stock, Seq,
and marginal user cost, eq. Unlike the previous case where we assumed static
output price changes, we are now investigating how long-run equilibrium stock
and marginal user cost changes in response to permanent price changes that occur
in the initial period. To simplify the analysis, we only look at the case where the
optimal values are both interior solutions.
To derive the e¤ect of a price increase on steady state stock and marginal user
cost of stock, we rst examine how the long-run supply and long-run demand
curves shift in the phase space. The long-run supply curve is the isocline that
traces out St+1   St = 0 while the long-run demand curve is the isocline that
shows t+1   t = 0: Recall that the steady state solutions to the dynamic
problem come from equations (2.28) and (2.29).
Let us rst determine how a change in p a¤ects the long-run supply curve.
When St+1   St = 0, we nd that @maxH@t = 0. The e¤ect of a shift in the long-
run supply curve on the marginal user cost and stock is determined by using
the implicit function theorem on @maxH
@t


















From (3.6) and (3.7), the long-run supply curve shifts up and to the left. A rise
in p increases the amount of labor in the resource sector because of the increase
in the value of marginal productivity. This results in a decrease in the long-run
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supply curve of the resource stock.
We can also derive the e¤ect of price on the long-run demand curve by using
the implicit function theorem on 0 = (1  )t    @maxH@St : The long-run demand


















If an interior solution exists, increasing the output price shifts the long-run
supply curve, or S isocline, to the left since more pressure is put on the resource
stock. However, the long-run demand curve, or  isocline, shifts down to the
left. The long-run demand for the output in the resource sector decreases due
to an increase in the price from the harvested stock. At the same time, the
supply of the resource stock decreases because there are incentives to overuse the
resource stock and long-run depletion of the stock occurs. Here, the steady state
resource stock decreases unambiguously but the marginal user cost may or may























































































 0: The overall
impact on the steady-state level of the marginal user cost depends upon the
magnitude of the shifts in both the long-run supply and demand curves. Figure
3.1 illustrates a case where the e¤ect of an increase in price due to opening to
trade results in an upward shift of the trajectory. Here, the marginal user cost
increases, from eq1 to eq2; and the steady-state stock is lower, Seq1 to Seq2.3
In the very short run, an increase in the price of the output from the resource
sector gives an incentive for all community members to allocate more labor into
the resource sector. Instantaneously, production from the resource sector rises
along with income of community members. At rst, the resource stock will decline
due to intensive extraction. However, with more intensive use of the stock, the
shadow price of the resource stock increases as each unit of the remaining stock
now has more of the variable input, labor, in the production process. This calls
for more preservation of the resource stock for future use. Although the e¤ect of
the long-run resource stock is unambigously decreasing, the overall e¤ect on the
marginal user cost of the resource stock is unclear. The temporary increase in
shadow value of the stock is mitigated by the decrease in demand for the output
in the resource stock because of the higher price. The long-run degradation of the
resource stock under community based management coincides with the dynamic
3We consider a case where a single steady-state outcome exists in the phase region in which
the optimal values of the control variables are interior solutions.The other phase regions are







St+1 – St = 0
µt – µt-1 = 0
Figure 3.1: Comparative Dynamics in a Change in Relative Price Due to Opening
to Trade
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results from Brander and Taylor (1997a). However, degradation of the resource
stock is an optimal outcome that maximizes long-run welfare and not due to
short-sightedness of any planner.
When a single stable separatrix exists, a price increase may cause the optimal
trajectory path to jump up as shown in Figure 3.1. The magnitude of the jump
of the trajectory determines if the property rights regime governing the resource
stock changes or remains the same. In Figure 3.2, we illustrate how a price
increase may or may not change the property rights regime. We simplify the
phase region by showing only  t; which delineates the phase diagram into regions
where the resource stock is closed (above  t) and where it is open (below  t).
We start at trajectory 1 where the resource stock is always open. A very small
increase in the price may not move the trajectory up at all, thus, resulting in
the same property rights regime. However, a larger shift from trajectory 1 to
trajectory 2 may lead to the full closure of the resource stock.
In this chapter, we have derived the e¤ects of trade on the resource stock in
the nite and innite horizon model. In the two-period nite horizon model, if it
is announced that the country will open to trade in a future period, the resource
stock increases prior to trade liberalization. Owners of the resource stock will
lessen their current extraction and limit entrance of non-community members.
Their actions in the current period build up the stock for future use. When the
country opens to trade and the relative price in the resoure sector increases, the
community will continue to decrease access of the resource stock to non-members
and we will see an increase in labor allocations in the resource sector. Increased










Figure 3.2: Property Rights Regimes and an Increase in Output Price due to
Opening to Trade
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In the innite horizon model, a permanent price increase decreases the steady
state stock level. However, degrading the stock maximizes welfare for the com-
munity as long as it follows the dynamic Nash equilibrium path. If we deviate
from this path by extracting resource stocks too quickly, or even too slowly, it will
not maximize welfare for the community. Therefore, the result from this section
must be interpreted very carefully: welfare is maximized only when the optimal
trajectory path that reduces the resource stock is followed.
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Chapter 4
Endogenizing the Trade Policy Choice
So far, we have investigated the case where the trade policy decision is exoge-
nously adopted in the economy. However, the decision to open or close the
economy to trade is truly endogenous from the point of view of the country. Po-
litical inuence by di¤erent groups within an economy can a¤ect the decision of
the government to open to trade. In this chapter, we analyze how interest groups
inuence the decision of the government to implement the trade policy of the
economy. Once we have endogenized the trade policy choice, we link it back to
the property rights regime choice governing stock over time.
There are two distinct approaches in modelling the e¤ect of political inuence
on trade policies: models that emphasize political competition between candi-
dates; and models that view governments as entities seeking to maximize political
support (Hillman, 1989). Models of political competition have parties, lobbying
groups and voters as entities in the economy. Lobbying groups contribute to a
party that supports their trade policy stand in order to maximize welfare. Then,
the party uses political contributions from the lobby groups to inuence voters
decisions in adopting a particular policy option. Political competition models
answer the broader questions regarding trade policy selection, such as what type
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of political party will dominate the policy choices in the economy or who will
benet from these policies.
The alternative view is to model the incumbent government as an entity that
maximizes political support by choosing optimally the type of trade policy given
the welfare of agents in the economy. Political support models have the benet of
answering more specic questions with regard to trade policy choice such as, what
is the extent to which a particular industry will be favored or what type of policy
instrument will be adopted by the government (Hillman, 1982)? The objective of
this chapter is to determine the equilibrium trade protection structure in a small
open economy. Specically, we analyze how lobby groups a¤ect the equilibrium
decision of the government to implement the trade policy. We also determine the
optimal property rights regime chosen by communities governing the resource
stock given the governments decision. A political support framework is used to
arrive at the answers.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) developed a political economy model showing
how various interest groups can lobby the government to inuence policy. In the
environmental economic literature, this framework has been used to determine
optimal pollution taxes, study the competitive lobbying behavior between pollut-
ing industries, and analyze the impact of free trade on environmental regulations
(Fredriksson, 1997; Aidt, 1998; Yu, 1999; Gulati, 2003). We adopt the political
economy framework by Grossman and Helpman to determine the e¤ect of en-
dogenously opening to trade on the welfare of the entities in our model, as well
as on the community membersproperty rights regime choice in governing the
use of a resource stock.
The remaining subsections in this chapter are divided into four parts. Section
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4.1 outlines the political economy structure of the model. Section 4.2 determines
the conditions by which the optimal trade regime is chosen given the political
economy framework. Section 4.3 illustrates the optimal trade instrument selected
by the government over time. Lastly, Section 4.4 derives the optimal property
rights regime pattern given an endogenous tari¤ rate.
4.1 Political Economy Structure
There are four main entities in the economy: (1) community members; (2) non-
community members; (3) owners of capital; and (4) the government. Among
these four entities, only community members (or the owners of the resource stock)
and owners of capital control a specic factor in production of a sector in the
economy. The non-community members are deemed as entities that have no
power or resources to lobby for any particular trade policy. The government
selects the trade policy. We assume that only the owners of a specic factor are
allowed to collude in order to create lobby groups that inuence the government
in choosing a trade policy.
Two types of trade policies are analyzed: a dichotomous measure of trade
regime and a continuous measure of tari¤ rates. First, we investigate the type
of trade regime that the government adopts, whether it is an autarky, state of
the economy where no outside trade exists, or free trade, where trade across
countries exist without any barriers. We then move from the extreme case of
a dichotomous trade policy choice to the implementation of optimal tari¤ rates
over time. Autarky and free trade can be achieved through the use of tari¤s.
A tari¤ rate of zero implies free trade. On the other hand, a tari¤ rate that
creates the same terms of trade within the economy, as well as the international
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market, mimics an autarkic regime. Throughout the analysis in this chapter, we
determine the level of tari¤s that the government selects for the economy given
social welfare and lobby contributions.
The owners of capital, owners of the resource stock and non-community mem-
bers maximize their welfare given the trade policy regime chosen by the govern-
ment. To simplify our analysis, we use the same notation as the previous chapters
but we introduce a denition for the optimal stream of welfare that all entities
in the economy obtain from the solution to the general equilbrium analysis. The
owners of capital maximize their stream of prots over time by optimally selecting
the amount of labor to employ in order to maximize welfare, given the decision
of all providers of labor. We can write the maximum stream of welfare of owners








fYx(K;Lxt)  wtLxtgtK ; (4.1)
where  is the tari¤ rate selected by the government, V Kt is the optimal value
derived by the owners of capital at time t and K is the discount factor.
Similarly, owners of the resource stock maximize returns from the stock over
time by choosing the amount of labor to allocate in both sectors of the economy
and regulating the use of the resource stock for non-community members. The
welfare derived by the owners of the resource stock, W S, for a particular trade












(wt(h  lmt) + p()mStf(L mt; lmt))tm
s.t. St+1   St = G(St) 
CX
m=1
(mStf (L mt; lmt)) NnStf (L nt; lnt) :
where V St is the optimal value derived by the owners of capital at time t and m
is the rate of time preference by the mth individual.
Each ith groups net welfare is equal to i = W i() i() 8 i = K;S, where
i() is the contribution schedule of the ith group. In this particular framework,
we disregard the issues of lobby formation and free riding amongst members of
a lobby group. Here, we assume that both the owners of the resource stock and
the owners of capital overcome free riding and lobby formation problems. Since
non-community members do not have lobby power, their contributions are equal
to zero.
The social welfare function, W , that designates the aggregate welfare of all
groups in the economy is linear in total earnings by all entities in the economy.




Vt( ; St()) = W
K() +W S(); (4.3)
where Vt( ; St()) is the optimal value derived by society at time t. Note that
the trade choice a¤ects social welfare directly through the relative price of the
commodities produced in the economy.
The government welfare depends on social welfare as well any contributions
made by the existing lobby groups. Formally,
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G() =W () + a(K() + S()); (4.4)
where a is a non-negative value representing the political weight given to the
contribution of all lobby groups. A large value of a implies that the government
places a greater weight on political contributions. A value of a equal to zero
implies that lobbying will have no e¤ect whatsoever on the decision of the gov-
ernment to adopt a particular policy. Here, the government does not have any
bias as to the source of the contribution, but only cares about the total amount of
contributions. The type of trade policy is determined through a two-stage non-
cooperative game as a sub-game perfect outcome. First, the existing lobby group
will determine the optimal political contribution schedule in order to maximize
the net welfare of the group. In the second stage, the government will choose the
optimal trade regime that maximizes its own welfare.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994) derive an
equilibrium in the trade policy game as a set of policy choices and contribution
schedules that are characterized by the following conditions:
Proposition 4.1. (Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994)):
The contribution schedule, (fio( o) gi=K;S;  o, is a sub-game perfect Nash Equi-
librium of the trade policy game if and only if:
(a). io( o); and  o is feasible for all lobby groups i;
(b). The trade policy regime,  o, maximizes W () + a(K() + S());
(c). The trade policy regime,  o, maximizes W i() io()+W ()+a(K()+
S()) for all lobby groups; and
(d). For all lobby groups, there exists  0 that maximizes the government wel-
fare, W () + a
P
i=K;S 
i(), such that i( 0) = 0:
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Condition (a) states that the contribution by all lobby groups must be feasible,
i.e., non-negative and less than the aggregate welfare of the lobby group. Con-
dition (b) stipulates that the government maximizes their own welfare by setting
the trade regime optimally given the contribution schedule of the lobby groups.
Condition (c) implies that the optimal trade regime choice must maximize the
joint welfare of the government and all the lobby groups involved in the political
process. Lastly, condition (d) states that for any lobby group, there must exist
a trade regime that elicits a contribution of nill from that lobby group, which
the government nds as equally attractive as the equilibrium generated from an
alternative trade regime.
4.2 Dichotomous Trade Regime Choice
In this subsection, the type of trade regime, which exists when either the owners
of the resource stock or owners of capital or both groups can lobby is determined.
We also derive the optimal contribution schedules from the lobby groups.
The government decides on the appropriate trade regime that maximizes its
welfare. Lobby groups that exist will be able to contribute to inuence the
decision of the government on whether to choose an autarkic or free trade regime.
Contributions are used by the current government for re-election purposes in order
to stay in power for the next term. Once the government chooses the particular
trade regime that maximizes its welfare, the regime will be adopted immediately.
Thus, we can simplify the analysis into a static problem where we look at the
maximized stream of welfare that each entity obtains and compare the results
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under the two possible trade regimes.
The instrument available for the government to establish either an autarkic or
free trade regime is a specic tari¤. A specic tari¤ is a xed charge per unit of
the imported good. At time t, the world price of good i adopted in the economy
upon opening to trade, pwi , will increase by the tari¤,  ; such that the resulting
domestic price is equal to pdi = p
w
i +  i: The presence of an import tari¤ will
a¤ect the terms of trade in the economy. A tari¤ placed on a good produced in
a sector will protect that sector by increasing the domestic price of that good
and, conversely, decreasing the relative price of the good in the other sector. For
example, if the manufacturing sector in this economy is protected by a specic
tari¤ but the resource sector is not, the resulting domestic price of the output
from the manufacturing sector will increase to pdK = p
w
K + K : Thus, the relative
price of the good produced in the resource sector decreases as the level of tari¤




: In this section, we consider only
two values for the tari¤ rate. Under free trade, K = 0 while under autarky,
K = K such that the tari¤ rate K creates the same terms of trade within the
economy as well as in the international market. This has implications in terms
of the preference of the lobby groups in the economy as well as their contribution
schedules. Throughout the chapter, we consider the case where the government
only chooses to implement a tari¤ in the manufacturing sector. The welfare from
the owners of capital is such that WK(0) < WM (K) while for the owners of the
resource stock, W S(0) > W S (K) : Furthermore, the contribution schedule for
the owners of capital is such that K(0) < M (K) while for the owners of the
resource stock, S(0) > S (K) :
The governments decision to select a particular trade regime depends on the
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following condition,
W ( K) + a(
K( K) + 
S( K)) > W ( 0K) + a(K( 0K) + S( 0K)): (4.5)
where  K is the optimal trade regime while 
0
K is the non-optimal trade regime.
The optimal trade regime in this dichotomous choice setting maximizes the gov-
ernments welfare derived from both the contributions and social welfare of the
economy.
4.2.1 Single Lobby Group
Let us rst assume that only the owners of capital can lobby while the owners
of the resource stock cannot lobby. We derive the optimal level of contribution
when a single lobby group exists given that the government chooses to implement
a tari¤ rate equal to K in the manufacturing sector or not. The net welfare of
the owners of capital under the two trade regimes can be summarized below:
K =
8><>: W
K(0)   K (0) if W (0) + aK (0) > W (K) + aK (K)
WK (K)  K (K) if W (0) + aK (0)  W (K) + aK (K)
9>=>;
(4.6)
Under a free trade regime, the level of lobby contribution is such that K (0) 
0: The maximum contribution level that the lobby group provides that makes him
indi¤erent between the two trade regimes is equal to the additional gains when
moving to a free trade regime from an autarky. Therefore, from (4.6), the lobby
group is indi¤erent between autarky and free trade when, WK(0)  K (0) =
WK(K): Rearranging, we nd that the maximum contribution level that owners
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of capital are willing to give to the government under free trade is K (0) =
WK(0)  WK(K): However, we have assumed that WK(0) < WK(K). Since
the minimum contribution level must be non-negative, we nd that K (0) = 0:
Thus, in a dichotomous trade regime scenario, the lobbying group will never
contribute a strictly positive amount under a trade regime that gives them a
lower level of welfare.
Under an autarky regime, the level of lobby contribution must also be non-
negative, K (K)  0: The maximum contribution levels that the owners of cap-
ital provide is equal to the additional gains when adopting an autarky as opposed
to a free trade regime. Therefore, from (4.6), the lobby group is indi¤erent be-
tween free trade and autarky when, WK(K) K (K) =WK(0): Therefore, the
lobby contribution under autarky must lie in the following range: 0  K (K) 
WK(K)   WK(0): Recall that K (0) = 0 and the government will choose a




There are two potential optimal values for K(K). If social welfare is greater
under autarky than free trade, then W (0)   W (K) < 0. This implies that
owners of capital would contribute an amount equal to zero since negative con-
tributions are not possible. However, when social welfare is greater under free




to make the government indi¤erent between the two trade
regimes.1 The amount contributed is equal to the weighted di¤erence in social
welfare under the two trade regimes. If the government puts more weight on
lobby contributions, the optimal contribution is lower.
We have now determined the optimal lobby contributions in both trade regimes,
1As long as condition (a) of Proposition 4.1 holds, this is an optimal solution to the problem.
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now we derive the condition when the lobby group contributes these amounts.
The owners of capital earn more net welfare under autarky when,
K(0) < K (K) :
Substituting for K(0) and K (K) along with 
K (0) = 0 and K(K) =
W (0) W (K)
a




< WK (K) : (4.7)
The su¢ cient condition for this inequality to hold occurs when social welfare
under autarky is greater than under free trade, i.e. W (0)  W (K) < 0: In this
case, the optimal contribution will be equal to zero. However, ifW (0) W (K) >




Otherwise, the owners of capital would prefer to have a free trade regime and
contribute nothing.
Figure 4.1 depicts the optimal contribution when the aggregate welfare of
the lobbyist and the social welfare are maximized under the same trade regime,
autarky. Without any contributions, the government will choose autarky to max-
imize social welfare, thus yieldingWK(K) for the owners of capital. Any positive
contribution will decrease net welfare by the amount of the contribution. In fact,
if the level of contribution equalled WK(0)  WK (K), the net welfare derived
by the owners of capital would be equal to the welfare under a free trade regime.
Figure 4.2 depicts the relationship between a contribution of the single lobby
group and net welfare when the trade policy preferences of the owners of capital do
not coincide with social welfare and it is optimal to contribute a positive amount.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal Contribution of Owners of Capital when Social Welfare
Change Coincide with Aggregate Welfare
government chooses to adopt a free trade regime resulting in net welfare for the




; the government chooses the autarkic regime and the
owners of capital earn net welfare equal to WK (K) 
W (0) W (K)
a
. Note that if
the net welfare lineWK2 is belowWK1, the lobby group would rather have a free
trade regime and always contribute nothing.
So far, we have disregarded problems associated with lobby formation and
lobby contribution between owners of capital and owners of the resource stock.
However, given the communal nature of the management of the resource stock,
it is more likely that the owners of capital are more e¢ cient in lobbying the gov-
ernment to adopt a particular trade regime than the communal members of a
resource stock (López, 2005). This implies that governments may skew the par-
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Figure 4.2: Optimal Contribution of Owners of Capital when Social Welfare
Change Does Not Coincide with Aggregate Welfare
the economy especially if they put more political weight on lobby contributions.
Thus, lobbying may explain why some governments implement trade policies
even though it knowingly results in the decrease of welfare of poorer members of
society.
4.2.2 Two Lobby Groups
Let us examine the case where there are two opposing lobby groups that exist
in the economy. Adopting an autarkic regime increases welfare for the owners
of capital (WK(0) < WK (K)) but free trade regimes increase welfare for the
owners of the resource stock (W S(0) > W S (K)). Furthermore, assume that
the two lobbying groups are equally powerful, meaning WK (K)   WK(0) =
W S(0)  W S (K) : We determine the optimal contribution levels of each lobby
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group along with the trade regime adopted by the government.
The objective of each lobby group is to maximize their own aggregare welfare
by optimally selecting their level of contribution given all other lobby groups
level of contribution. From the previous section, we have determined that a lobby
group will contribute an amount equal to zero under a trade regime that gives
them lower welfare. Thus, the owners of capital contribute zero under free trade
while owners of the resource stock contribute zero under autarky, i.e. S (K) =
K (0) = 0. The net welfare returns by the owners of capital and owners of the






K(0);W S(0)  S (0) if W (0) + aS (0) > W (K) + aK (K)
WK (K)  K (K) ;W S (K) if W (0) + aS (0)  W (K) + aK (K)
9>=>;
(4.8)
From the previous section, we know that the optimal lobbying contribution
ranges from 0 to additional gains from adopting the trade regime that gaurantees
the highest welfare. This implies the following: 0  S (0)  W S(0)  W S (K)
and 0  K (0)  WK (K)  WK (0) : If an autarky is established, from (4.8)
this implies that, K (K) 
W (0) W(K)
a
+ S (0) : Since we have assumed that
the two lobby groups are equally powerful, the maximum lobby contribution
by both the owners of capital and owners of the resource stock is such that
maxK (K) = max
S (0) :We can simplify the optimal condition for an autarky
as 0  W (0) W(K)
a
: To ensure that this inequality holds, social welfare under
autarky must be greater than under a free trade regime, else the government
would never adopt an autarky which is a contradiction to our earlier statement.2
2Note that the level of contribution by the owners of capital will always be in the feasible
80
The result also holds true when the owners of capital are more powerful than the
owners of the resource stock, i.e. WK (K) WK(0) > W S(0) W S (K) :3
The owners of capital will earn more returns from autarky if the following
condition holds true:
K(0) < K (K) :
Imposing the assumption that WK (K) WK(0) = W S(0) W S (K) along
with K (K) =
W (0) W(K)
a









This condition implies that the owners of capital will only lobby to ensure an
autarky if the weighted social welfare change from autarky to free trade is less
than two times the welfare gain by the owners of capital.
The opposite holds true when the government adopts a free trade regime.
The owners of the resource stock must lobby an amount equal to S (0) 
W(K) W (0)
a
+ WK (K)   WK (0) : It must be the case that 0 >
W(K) W (0)
a
when both lobby groups are equally powerful, which implies that social welfare is
higher under free trade than autarky. However, similar to the previous analysis,
the owners of the resource stock will only lobby to ensure free trade if the weighted
di¤erence in the social welfare between the trade regimes are greater than two




3However, no clear results can be obtained if the owners of the resource stock are more
powerful than the owners of capital.
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times the di¤erence of the change in welfare of owners of the resource stock. This
means, S(0) > S (K) along with W









W S(0) W S (K)

: (4.10)
Figure 4.3 illustrates the optimal lobbying contribution of owners of the re-
source stock when an equally powerful lobby group exists and it is benecial
for the lobbying group to contribute a positive amount to ensure his preferred
trade regime. Without the presence of the competing lobbyist, the owners of
the resource stock would not need to contribute anything since the trade regime
preferred by the government to maximize social welfare coincides with their own
preferences. However, with a competing lobby group, the move from an autarkic
trade regime to a free trade regime is not ensured since the opposing lobby group
can contribute a signicant amount to keep the autarkic regime. The broken
line represents welfare levels that are not guaranteed to be reached; given that
the owners of capital can contribute up to WK (K) WK (0) in order to obtain




+ WK (K)   WK (0) to ensure that the economy moves
toward the free trade regime. This particular result is similar to the outcome
in the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model where they show that each lobby



















Figure 4.3: Net Welfare for Owners of Resource Stock with Two Competing
Lobby Groups in the Economy
4.3 Trade Liberalization Over Time
We now look at how trade liberalization is adopted gradually by investigating
the optimal specic tari¤ placed on the di¤erent goods produced in the economy.
In this section, we determine the tari¤ rate that maximizes the governments
welfare in the presence of two lobbying groups as well as determine the tari¤s
e¤ect on communitys property rights regime choice and stock over time.
Consider the same model as in the previous section, where the governments
objective is to be able to maximize its own welfare by optimally choosing a
particular trade policy. However, two important characteristics of the problem
are di¤erent. First, the trade instrument is a continuous tari¤ rate that the
government can set on the good produced in the manufacturing sector instead of
a discrete dichotomous choice between autarky and free trade. We also assume
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that the tari¤ rate is determined during each time period. Unlike the previous
case where the trade regime is set for all time during the initial period, we allow
a more exible tari¤ rate decided by the government during each time period.
Similar to the previous section, we focus on an import tari¤ in the manufac-
turing sector. The only di¤erence in notation is that the tari¤will now be allowed
to vary during each time period. Thus, the resulting domestic price of the output
from the manufacturing sector is pdK;t = p
w
K;t +  t: The relative price of the good




: This has implications in terms of the preference of
the lobby groups in the economy as well as their contribution schedules. In this
case, if the government only chooses to implement a tari¤ in the manufacturing
sector, the contribution schedule for the owners of capital will be increasing in










When a particular economy has comparative advantage in the production of
the output from the resource sector, the country becomes a net exporter in the
resource intensive good and a net importer of the capital intensive good. The
government chooses the tari¤ level placed on imported goods that compete with
output produced domestically from the manufacturing sector. The governments
objective is to maximize social welfare plus the weighted value of contribution
over time by optimally selecting a tari¤ rate in the manufacturing sector during
each period. Recall from equation (4.3) we dened the stream of social welfare as
W ( t) 
P1
t=0 Vt( t; St( t)) where Vt( t; St( t)) is the maximum value function








Vt( t; St( t)) + a
1X
t=0
(Kt ( t) + 
S
t ( t)): (4.11)
Here, the main di¤erence between the original government problem formula-
tion in equation (4.4) and the equation above is that the tari¤ rates are chosen
during each time period. Since the resource stock changes over time as well, we
express the e¤ect of tari¤ directly on the value of social welfare as well as in-
directly through the stock over time. The government also derives welfare from
the political contributions of both lobby groups in the economy. The larger the
weight, a, the greater the preference placed by the government on obtaining these
contributions. In this case, we assume that the tari¤ revenues are redisbursed
lump sum back into the economy.
The net welfare function of the owners of capital and owners of the re-
source stock can easily be extended to take into account the time-dependent
nature of the problem. The net welfare of the lobby group i is equal to i =P1
t=0 V
i




t( t): Since the stock level changes over time, the
tari¤ level would also have an impact on the resource stock during each time
period.
The optimal tari¤rate maximizes the joint welfare of the government and each
lobby group in the political process (as shown in condition (c) of Proposition 4.1).






















Assuming that contribution functions are di¤erentiable, the optimal tari¤that
maximizes joint welfare must satisfy the following necessary condition ,
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@Vt( t; St( t))
@ t
+











8 i = K;S:
However, the governments maximization implies that the following rst-order
condition holds,4
@Vt( t; St( t))
@ t
+










Here, we nd that the government selects the tari¤ by equating the direct
marginal returns from the tari¤, @Vt( t;St( t))
@ t
; to the sum of the marginal contri-





; plus the indirect impact of tari¤s through




. The term @Vt( t;St( t))
@St
is the shadow value or the mar-
ginal user cost of the stock. As the stock level decreases, the marginal user cost
increases. Given the variability in the marginal user cost of the stock, we can
infer that the optimal tari¤ must also be changing over time.
Combining the equations (4.13) and (4.14), we arrive at the necessary condi-
tions for a locally truthful contribution schedule during each time period,






= 0 8 i = K;S: (4.15)
Here, we nd that each lobby group sets its contribution schedule so that the
marginal returns from lobbying will equal the marginal contribution made to the
government during each time period. The shape of the contribution schedules by
4This coincides with condition (b) of Proposition 4.1.
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each lobby group should reect their true preferences. The second-order condition
for locally truthful contribution is,





 0 8 i = K;S: (4.16)
4.4 Tari¤Rates, Property Rights and Labor Al-
location
In this subsection, we derive the property rights regime patterns governing the
use of the resource stock given an endogenous tari¤ rate. First, we solve the
governments problem of choosing the tari¤ rate. Then, we look at the problem
faced by the owners of capital. Lastly, we combine the two conditions derived
from the governments problem and the owner of capitals problem with the rst
order conditions from the optimization problem of the representative community
member to derive the property rights regime patterns governing the resource
stock.
Let us assume that the contribution schedule for the owners of capital and
the owners of the resource stock follow a quadratic functional, i.e.










where K is the tari¤ rate that creates an autarky, qK and qS are slope parameters
of the contribution schedule and we assume that qK < qS: From equation (4.1)
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and (4.2), we can re-write the governments problem in (4.12) of deriving the





















Here, we have reformulated the problem such that the output price in the resource
sector is normalized instead of the output price in the manufacturing sector. The
necessary condition that maximizes the governments problem during each time
period is the following,
Yx(K;Lxt)
pRt
= a(qS t   qK t):
The rst-order condition shows that the marginal change in social welfare must
equal the marginal change in the weighted contributions derived by the govern-
ment. The second-order condition that guarantees that the government maxi-
mizes its own welfare as long as,
 a(qS   qK)  0: (4.19)
The second-order condition holds since we have assumed qS > qK : Note here





Since we have assumed that qK < qS, the optimal tari¤ rate that the gov-
ernment chooses will be positive as long as the manufacturing sector produces a
positive amount.
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To incorporate the e¤ect of an endogenous tari¤rate in our general equilibrium
problem, we solve for the Nash equilibrium in our general equilibrium problem
that determines a set of labor allocations, wage rates and tari¤ rates in the
economy. Recall that the manufacturers of capital maximize quasi-rent from
capital by equating the prevailing wage rate in the market with the value of
marginal product of labor (see Equation 2.19). The community members solve
for their optimal wealth over time by determining their labor allocations in both
sectors of the economy as well as the number of non-community members allowed
into the resource sector (see Equation 2:20). To simplify our analysis, we only
consider the case where the choice of labor allocation in the resource sector by
the community members has an interior solution (h > lct > 0) but allow for full
closure (lnt = 0) and partial opening (lnt > 0) to non-community members.
The tari¤ rate per period,  t ; enters into the general equilibrium problem





: Substituting (4.20) into p





: By substituting wt using (2:19) and  t using
(4.20) into the rst order conditions from the representative community member

























= lnt > 0; lntt = 0; (4.23)
t t 1 = (1 )t (G0(St) Ccf(L ct; lct)+Nnf(L nt; lnt)) pcf(L ct; lct);
(4.24)
St+1   St = G(St)  CcStf(L ct; lct) NnStf(L nt; lnt); (4.25)
where t  t+1. The interpretation of the rst order conditions follow that
in Chapter 2.4. We have just substituted the optimal relative price equal to the
relative price chosen by the government given the optimal tari¤ rate. Using the
same procedure as in Chapter 2.4, we derive the phase diagram illustrating the
optimal path of stock and the marginal user cost.
Since there are two control variables, the phase plane in the state and co-
state space are derived. However, we can divide the phase plane into two distinct
regions depending on the optimal control path: (1) an interior solution exists for
both controls (lnt > 0; lct < h); and (2) an interior solution exists for own labor
and the resource sector is fully closed (lnt = 0; lct < h).
First, we derive the equation that traces out a contour dividing the regions,
where non-community labor is greater than or equal to zero. Whenever t > 0,













where t(St) delineates two regions in the phase space: where non-community
labor is equal to zero or strictly greater than zero. Any value of t greater than
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or equal to t(St) implies non-community labor is equal to zero. In order to
illustrate the region in the phase space where non-community labor is equal to
zero as opposed to strictly greater than zero, we draw the function t(St) in state
and costate space. Taking the rst and second derivative of t(St) with respect




























 0 and @
2t
@S2t
 0: Thus, the function t(St) is convex and decreasing
in the stock. The region above t implies that non-community labor is equal
to zero. When t is equal to zero, non-community labor is positive and this is
depicted by the region below t.
The optimal trajectories for the state and control variables are found as the
solution to the following equations based on the maximum principle,
(lct; lnt) = argmaxL; (4.26)










TST+1 = 0: (4.29)
We derive the Hessian of the Lagrangean as negative semi-denite, which
implies that the determinant of the Hessian is positive and the diagonal elements
are non-positive. We derive the the following comparative statics (see Appendix








 0; and @lnt
@St
 0: (4.30)
From (4.30) we nd that as the shadow value of the resource stock increases,
the representative community member allocates less labor and allows less non-
community labor in the resource sector. Also, any increase in stock will lead
to non-decreasing community and non-community labor, ceteris paribus. These
results are needed to obtain the isoclines in each region of the phase plane.
In order to derive the isocline and trajectories, we utilize equations (4:26)  
(4:29). Using the same procedure as in Chapter 2.4, we derive the isocline in both
regions in the phase space. The stock, S, and marginal user cost, , isoclines, are
increasing and decreasing, respectively in both regions in the phase space (see
Appendix D for formal proofs).
The co-state and state isoclines are the steady-state solutions for equations
(4:27) and (4:28). Using equations (4:27) and (4:28) along with the comparative
statics from equation (4:30), we can illustrate a potential phase diagram as shown
in Figure 4.4. The  isocline is the long-run demand for the resource stock
while the S isocline is the long-run supply of the resource stock. The long-run
equilibrium resource stock and shadow value are Seq and eq, respectively. The
unstable regions are: to the left of the S isocline and above the  isocline; and to
the right of the S isocline and below the  isocline. In these regions, the system
moves away from the steady state.5
In Figure 4.4, the long-run equilibrium is in the region where the commu-
nity utilizes all labor in the resource stock and close the resource stock to non-
community members. The heavy arrowed curve represents the converging sepa-
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Figure 4.4: Adjustment Path and Steady State Values of Resource Stock and
Shadow Price of Stock with an Endogenous Tari¤ Rate
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ratrix. Given a su¢ ciently large initial stock level, community members close o¤
the resource sector in all time periods but do not initially allocate all labor into
the resource sector. In general, we nd the same ve potential property rights
regime patterns as in Chapter 2.4.
When we endogenize the tari¤ choice through lobbying by the government,
we do not derive a discrete jump in the trajectory as in the case of exogenous
trade regimes. Instead we obtain a smooth optimal trajectory over time. Similar
to the baseline innite horizon model, we continue to nd ve potential property
rights regime patterns when endogenizing the tari¤ choice.
In this chapter, we analyzed the e¤ects of lobbying on the choice of trade
policies by the government. Lobby groups have inuence over the trade regime
choice of the government as long as the government places considerable weight
on the contributions received from lobbyists. If a single lobby group exists, they
may be able to contribute enough funds so as to obtain the trade regime they
prefer. However, when two equally powerful but opposing lobbying parties exist,
the lobby group where trade regime preferences coincide with societys preference
will determine the trade regime. Lobby groups also have an impact on the tari¤
protection rate. We nd that the optimal tari¤ rate changes over time since it
is a function of the marginal user cost of the stock. However, endogenizing the
tari¤ choice yields the same property rights regime patters as in the baseline
innite horizon model. Instead of a discrete jump in the trajectory path when
trade regime is chosen exogenously, we follow a smooth trajectory over time.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Common Property Resource
Experiment
The previous sections have suggested theoretical results governing the trade
policy-property rights regime evolution-resource stock relationship. This section
tests some of the theoretical results derived in the previous chapters. In particu-
lar, we test how property rights regimes and labor allocations are determined in a
controlled laboratory experiment. We also determine how resource stocks evolve
through the selection of labor allocations and property rights regime when there
is an announced change in the terms of trade. It would have been also desirable
to extend the experimental model to test the long run e¤ects of trade as well as
endogenizing the trade choice. Unfortunately, budgetary constraints limited the
treatments in the experiment.
One of the earliest experimental studies that examined behavior within com-
mon pool resources was conducted byWalker, Gardner and Ostrom (1990). Their
study tried to determine if subjects in a common property resource dilemma fol-
lowed the predicted Nash equilibrium. Subjects were given a choice of investing
in market 1, where they earn a xed return on their investment, or in market
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2, where earnings depend on the proportion of their investment in this market
relative to total investment. In this scenario, the second market is akin to invest-
ing in a static resource stock. Two treatments were considered: high endowment
of tokens and low endowment of tokens. Nash equilibrium was found to be a
good predictor of aggregate behavior in the low endowment case and in the latter
rounds of the high endowment case. However, Nash equilibrium behavior is not
a good predictor of individual decisions. Subjects tended to utilize various rules
of thumb in determining the amount of tokens to invest in either market.
In the common pool resource experiment byWalker, Gardner and Ostrom (1990),
the resource stock was assumed to be static and completely regenerate in the next
time period. In reality, the available stock in the next period depends upon the
amount of extraction in the current period as well as the regenerative capacity
of the stock. Thus, over-harvesting may result in the destruction of the resource
stock. Walker and Gardner (1992) investigate how subjects behave if they are
faced with a positive probability in terminating the experiment whenever sub-
jects invest in the resource market. Results indicate that when faced with early
termination of the experiment, there is still over-investment in the resource mar-
ket even when a safety bu¤er on the available resource stock is put in place. This
implies that subjects decisions are myopic. Herr, et al. (1997) also conducted a
time-dependent common pool resource game. They also nd decisions by subjects
to be more myopic than dynamic.1
One reason why over harvesting may occur in a common pool resource frame-
1Mason and Philipps (1997) conducted a similar time-dependent game with a public re-
source. They investigated how rms in an oligopoly manage a common resource. However,
their main point of emphasis is not the path of the harvesting trajectory but the steady-state
solution.
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work is because of the lack of any enforceable contracts to curb this behav-
ior. Communication, as a means of enforcing "contracts" amongst group mem-
bers, was found to have a positive impact on the preservation of the resource
stock. Ostrom and Walker (1991) investigated the e¤ectiveness of communica-
tion in achieving a cooperative solution to preserve the resource stock. They
conducted a static common pool resource experiment but allowed for various
types of communication patterns within treatments. Single shot communication
during the beginning of the experiment allowed minimal improvement above the
non-cooperative equilibrium. If costless repeated communication is allowed, the
cooperative equilibrium can be sustained. However, when communication be-
comes costly, cooperation can still occur between groups but it will take longer.
Hackett, et al. (1994) test the robustness of the e¤ect of communication but for
heterogeneous individuals. Results indicate that heterogeneous individuals create
distributional conict over the access of the resource stock even with communi-
cation.
The existing institutions governing the resource stock have been assumed to
be exogenously determined by experimenters in common pool resource games,
thus far. However, Vyrastekova and Van Soest (2003) endogenize the cost of
enforcement through group voting and show that individuals tend to be more co-
operative as long as the majority favors enforcing resource management amongst
community members.
The studies presented have indicated that there is a signicant impact of two
types of externalities related to common property resources: an intratemporal
externality, or crowding out e¤ect within times; and an intertemporal externality,
or stock e¤ect across time. Also, communication does seem to have a signicant
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e¤ect on individualsdecisions. Lastly, voting can a¤ect how individuals govern
the use of the resource stock. This particular experiment tries to combine these
elements by analyzing how community members determine the type of property
rights regime governing the resource stock through a majority voting rule, in the
presence of a crowding out and stock e¤ect. Thus, we design a dynamic common
property resource game. Dynamic implies that all the treatments will have the
stock evolving over time. Furthermore, common property implies that a group of
individuals own the stock and they will be allowed to choose the type of property
rights regime governing its use. The remaining sections of this chapter are divided
into the following: Section 5.1 outlines the hypotheses that will be tested in the
experiment. The experimental design is presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3
summarizes the design conditions and parameters used to simulate the baseline
results for the laboratory experiment. Section 5.4 shows the descriptive results
from the experiment and Section 5.5 concludes the chapter with a formal analysis
of the experimental data.
5.1 Hypotheses
The experiment tested selected hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.
One of the central objectives of this dissertation is to link the e¤ect of opening
to trade on resource stock levels through an endogenous property rights regime
mechanism. This particular experiment tries to determine this impact as well as
derive the optimal property rights regime patterns governing the resource stock.
We test two categories of hypotheses. First, we outline game-theoretic hypotheses
regarding extraction levels and choice of property rights regimes in a two-sector
general equilibrium model. Next, we test behavioral hypothesis with regard to
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the e¤ect of opening to trade (as proxied by a change in the relative price of
goods produced in the economy) on the resource stock through changes in labor
allocation and property rights regime choices.
First, the game-theoretic hypothesis with regard to extraction behavior is
dened as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Dynamic Nash equilibrium hypothesis governing the extraction
of a dynamic resource stock. Owners of a resource stock behave as rational,
wealth maximizing individuals and expect all other members of their community
to behave in the same manner over time. Thus, when all community members
are homogeneous, they choose extraction levels that satisfy equations (2.8) to
(2.11) as well as take into consideration the stock evolution from equation (2.6).
However, when community members are heterogeneous, they choose extraction
levels that satisfy equations (2.14) to (2.17) while considering the stock equation.
As an alternative to this hypothesis, we compare the results of the analysis for
the case of myopic Nash equilibrium behavior. Here, individuals maximize earn-
ings for each individual period without taking into consideration the stock e¤ect
over time. This implies that we follow the same equations stated in hypothesis 1
but now, the marginal user cost of the stock is equal to zero. Here, individuals
no longer take into consideration the future consequences of their actions on the
resource stock.
The game-theoretic hypothesis of property rights regime choice is the follow-
ing:
Hypothesis 2. Dynamic Nash equilibrium hypothesis governing the optimal
property rights regime pattern voted by the community over time. The property
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rights regime chosen by the community will depend on the preference of the
median community member. The median community member will vote on a
property rights regime sequence that maximizes his wealth over time given the
expected choices of all other community members. Thus, the representative com-
munity member or median voter chooses the property rights regime that satises
equations (2.8) to (2.11) or (2.14) to (2.17), respectively.
As an alternative to this hypothesis, we look at the myopic Nash equilibrium
behavior of the community where they always choose a common property resource
management scheme that closes the resource stock to non-community members.
It must be noted that the choice of property rights regimes and labor alloca-
tion by the community are jointly determined. This implies that we will test if
both labor allocations and property rights regime choice follow a dynamic Nash
equilibrium path or the alternative myopic Nash path. It will not make sense
to individually test each choice separately because the choice variables jointly
determine the earnings of subjects.
Next, we specify the behavioral result expected from the experiment:
Hypothesis 3. E¤ect of price change on stock levels in a Finite Model. An
announced price increase in the future results in the community members trying
to build the stock up by optimally selecting their labor use in both sectors in
the economy and adjusting the property rights regime that govern the use of the
resource stock. More specically, we would nd that the stock levels are higher





If subjects do internalize some of the stock e¤ect over time, we will likely
follow a dynamic equilibrium path that seeks to maximize wealth over time and
not only earnings round by round. Clusters that adjust labor allocation and
property rights regime choices to build stocks in anticipation of the future price
increases may show some inclination of following a dynamic path. However,
following the optimal dynamic path is another matter altogether.
5.2 Experimental Design
The experimental design is intended to capture the elements from the two-
sector general equilibrium model introduced in Chapter 2. Community and non-
community members allocating labor into the two sectors of the economy are
replaced by subjects who earn cash benets from the experiment by accumulat-
ing currency dollars using a parameterized version of equations (2.7) and (2.13).
The general design of the experiment follows a common property resource game
where subjects allocate their labor hours into di¤erent market types. Market 1 is
used to mimic the earnings from the resource sector in the model; while market
2 is used to capture earnings from the manufacturing sector. There are some
elements in this experiment that di¤er signicantly from the usual common pool
resource game. First, most common pool resource experiments in the literature
are static repeated games. Though this has the advantage of analytical and the-
oretical simplicity, it hinders us from understanding any of the dynamic elements
that may inuence behavior. Second, the institutions in almost all common
pool resource games are exogenously given and xed throughout the experiment.
However, in this game, we will allow for an endogenously determined institution
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governing the use of the resource stock. Lastly, the two sectors in the economy
are connected by an endogenous wage rate instead of an exogenous wage rate
usually used in the literature.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Maryland using a fully
computerized program that captures the basic elements of the two-sector dynamic
general equilibrium model. Subjects were recruited from a pool of graduate and
undergraduate students who have a background in economics and have had prior
experience in participating in experiments. Prior to volunteering, subjects were
not informed of any specic details related to the games content. They were
only told of the average duration of the game (1.5 hours), and that earnings will
be based on their decisions during the experiment.
Each experimental session was conducted in the following manner. To ensure
that all 24 terminals in the computer laboratory are used, more than 24 subjects
were recruited during each session. If the session is already full, those that were
not able to participate are given a $5 attendance fee as well as a guaranteed
slot for a future session. All participants are logged on to their computer with a
messenger program and two windows open, a practice window and a window for
the actual experiment.2 At the beginning of each section, the instructions are read
aloud while the projector screen provides visual assistance (see Appendix E.1 for
sample instructions). A practice session is played before the actual experiment
is conducted. After the experiment, a post survey questionnaire is handed out to
all subjects, after which they are paid for their participation.
During an experimental session, each subject participates in two treatments.
2Beside each terminal is a hard copy of all the instructions and a copy of the student
newspaper, which is used to ll the time during waiting periods between rounds.
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The sequence of the experiment during each session is summarized in Figure
5.1. Subjects were randomly placed into a six-person cluster containing two
groups. The rst group in the cluster comprised of ve individuals representing
the community, who had de facto rights over the use of a stock. The second group
in the cluster contained one individual representing ve non-community members
that did not have any rights to the use of the resource stock. Each subject stayed
in these groups throughout the experiment. Instructions were simultaneously
read to all subjects, after which a two-round practice was conducted. Group 1
individuals acted rst in each round, while group 2 members waited. Once all
group 1 members nish, group 2 members respond while group 1 waited. After
all group 2 members are nished with their decision, the results are displayed
in front of all participants in a summary table and the next round starts again.
Throughout the entire session, subjects were allowed to view their earnings and
their past decisions. However, since we simulated an open loop solution, the stock
levels over time were not shown to subjects in their history box. This continues
until the last round. Before paying o¤ the participants, they are required to
answer a post survey questionnaire.3
3It must be noted that the main focus and source of data that is used to test the hypotheses
come from group 1 members (subjects representing the community). It would have been pos-
sible to use the computer as representatives of non-community members. We have chosen to
include live subjects as representatives of the non-community members because group 1 mem-
bers may react di¤erently when faced with a computer acting as a group 2 member. Having
live subjects to interact with may elicit more truthful responses from subjects as opposed to
computerized responses. It would be interesting to re-run the experiment in the future with















out by all subjects
Subjects receive their
earnings
Figure 5.1: Sequence in the Experiment
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Subjects earned "currency dollars" by allocating labor in two types of mar-
kets. In market 1, subjects received income as a proportion of the number of
labor hours allocated into this market relative to total labor hours. In market 2,
income was dependent upon the prevailing wage rate. The decisions of the sub-
jects were framed such that they allocated 10 units of their total labor hours into
these two markets. Thus, subjects can allocate their labor units into the man-
ufacturing sector (market 2) and earn a wage rate equal to the marginal value
product of labor in that sector. Alternatively, they can also allocate labor into
the resource sector (market 1) and earn an amount equal to the value of harvest.
In the manufaturing sector, the wage is determined by how many people enter
into the sector. The more participants allocate labor into the sector, the lower
the contribution of each participant into the production of output, therefore de-
creasing the wage rate. Thus, wage varies during each round depending upon the
total number of labor hours allocated into the sector. In the resource sector, total
earnings depend upon the amount of stock, harvest of other participants and the
relative price of harvested resource. The amount of available stock depends upon
the growth of the stock, initial stock level as well as total allocated labor by all
individuals. In all the treatments, subjects were informed that the initial stock
level would start low, however, it could potentially grow over time as long as less
labor is allocated in market 1.
Group 1 members allocate their labor between the two markets and chose to
keep the resource stock open or closed to non-community members by voting. If
they decide to keep the resource stock open, a secondary voting question regarding
the maximum allowed number of labor hours per group 2 member is answered.
Here, group 1 members vote on the amount of labor hours per individual they
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allow into the resource sector from, 0 to 10. The majority voted by individuals was
multiplied by 5 to obtain the total permitsavailable for the group 2 member.
Once the amount of permits are chosen, group 2 members then choose the amount
of labor they allocate into the two sectors given the constraint on allowable labor
hours in the resource sector.4
Group 1 members are allowed to communicate amongst each other via the
MSN messenger system but their individual decisions were kept private. Before
the rst round of a treatment, all group 1 members were given 5 minutes to chat
via messenger to familiarize themselves with the program. In the subsequent
rounds, they are no longer given any time to explicitly communicate but they
were allowed to chat throughout the duration of the treatment. Allowing for
communication helps to sustain any agreements formulated by the group (see
Ostrom and Walker, 1991).
There are four di¤erent treatments. In the rst treatment, all community
members have the same harvesting e¢ ciency (homogeneous). In another treat-
ment, community members have varying harvesting e¢ ciencies (heterogeneous).
These cases serve as the base treatments. A set of treatments where trade e¤ects
(output price changes) are tested is also conducted with homogeneous and het-
erogeneous community members. All participants know a priori that the price
of harvested output will increase on the fth round. In this way, we are able
to test how property rights regime patterns and labor allocations are a¤ected in
the presence of an announced increase in terms of trade in the resource sector.
Each treatment consists of 10 rounds. Four sessions were conducted containing
two treatments each. The rst treatment contained homogeneous community
4See Appendix E.2 for sample viewing screen faced by group 1 and 2 members.
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Base Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Output Price Change Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Note: Four sessions were conducted containing two treatments each.
Table 5.1: Experimental Design
members and in the second treatment, harvesting e¢ ciencies varied. The rst
two sessions did not have any price change while the last two sessions had price
changes. To test for any ordering e¤ects, two sessions were conducted by inter-
changing the order of the two treatments. Table 5.1 summarizes the treatments
of the experiment.
After the main experiment, a post survey questionnaire was conducted to col-
lect background information from subjects regarding their prior experience with
experiments and socio-economic prole. Subjects were given a participation fee
along with the additional income they earn during each session. In the experi-
ment, all earnings were in the form of currency dollars. The exchange rate for
each currency dollar to real dollar was approximately 0.40. On average each
participant earned $21.86.
5.3 Design Conditions and Parameterization of
the Model
5.3.1 Functions and Parameters
The set of parameters used in a particular session determines the design condition
in the laboratory experiment. In each session, there are either homogeneous or
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heterogeneous community members in each group 1 cluster and either the price
stays the same during the whole period or it changes over time. Given these pos-
sibilities, there are four design conditions used in the experiment: homogeneous
or heterogeneous community members with prices constant or changing. Table
5.2 presents the functional form and parameters used to represent the maximiza-
tion problems in equations (2.7) and (2.13) in the laboratory experiment. In each
session, subjects participate in two treatments lasting ten rounds each. The only
di¤erence between the two treatments in each session is the harvesting e¢ ciency
in group 1. In some cases, the harvesting e¢ ciencies are the same, 0.0004, or
they di¤er with values ranging from 0.0003 to 0.0005. We try to minimize any
ordering e¤ects by conducting only two treatments in each session where harvest-
ing e¢ ciencies are di¤erent.5 We test for the e¤ect of an announced price change
starting at the fth round from 5 to 8.5 units. In all, there are two sessions each
where, either the price does not change at all in two treatments of ten rounds
each, or where the price changes during the fth round of each treatment.
In market 2 or the manufacturing sector, the owners of capital maximize
their returns to capital over time by hiring labor. The sector-specic capital in
the manufacturing sector is normalized to 1. The production function in the
manufacturing sector for the jth cluster is specied to be quadratic in total labor
hired by the owners of capital. Thus, the objective function faced by the owners
of capital in the jth cluster is written as,
5We formally test the presence of any ordering e¤ects in the succeeding subsections by




Number of subjects in a cluster 5
Number of Group 1 in one cluster 4
Number of Group 2 in one cluster 1
Maximum number of labor hours per subject 10
Production function in the manufacturing sector a = 6.75
(aLx-bLx 2 ) b = 0.0325
Production function in the resource sector c = 50
p Η S t (cLr-dLr
2 )(l/Lr) d = 0.001
Harvesting efficiency (Η  )
Harvesting efficiency for Group 2 subjects 0.00025





Relative price2 (p ) 5
Growth of stock over time3  e =0.59
G(S t )=eS t-1 (1-(S t-1 /f)) f = 80
1 The harvesting efficiency when all community members are homogeneous is equal to 0.0004.
2 In the treatments with a change in price, price increases from 5 to 8.5 during the fifth round.
3 The initial stock is equal to 10.




Y (Lxjt) = aLxjt   bLx2jt   wjtLxjt;
where a and b are parameters of the production function. The optimal condition
that solves the problem of the owners of capital shows that the marginal product
of labor must equal the wage rate. From this, the variable wage of the jth cluster
during each time period t is derived to be,
wjt = a  2bLxjt:
Wage is positive as long as a
2b
 Lxjt and this assumption is satised given
the parameters chosen in the model. From the parameters of the model, wage
can be as low as 0.25 or reach a maximum of 6.75 currency dollars per labor hour.
For each additional unit of labor allocated into the resource sector, the marginal
decrease in wage is equal to 0.065 units.
The production function for entrants into the resource sector follows the gen-
eral functional form as specied in equation (2.3). The product of the harvesting
e¢ ciency, current stock and the e¤ort function determine the level of harvest in
the resource sector. The e¤ort function for the ith individual in the jth cluster is
quadratic in the total number of labor in the resource sector. Also, the individual
returns from labor in the resource sector is a proportion of own labor to the total
labor in this sector. The harvest from the resource sector for the ith individual
in the jth cluster is expressed as,




where c and d are parameters in the e¤ort function and Ljt is the summation of
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all community labor and non-community labor in the resource sector.6 Whenever
the amount of labor in the resource sector is equal to zero, the harvest is zero as
well. As the stock level increases over time, the marginal harvest from a unit of
labor increases.






where e is the intrinsic growth rate of the stock and f is the
natural carrying capacity. Without any harvest, the steady-state equilibrium
occurs when stock is equal to zero or when the carrying capacity, f , is reached.
Furthermore, the maximum sustainable yield of the stock is equal to f
2
: Given
the logistic functional form, the stock in the next period is calculated according













It must also be noted that in each cluster, there are two groups. In group
1, there are a total of ve individuals representing members of the community
while there is 1 member in group 2 representing ve homogeneous non-community
members. Even though there are e¤ectively 10 subjects in a representative econ-
omy, this study does recognize that the assumption that subjects take wage as
given may not be strictly fullled. However, given that the marginal change in
wage is relatively small, i.e. about 0.06 currency dollars per unit of labor hour,
a single subject in the representative economy is not likely to realize that their
6The value of harvest is equal to Hij multiplied by the relative price. The relative price in
some treatments will stay the same during the whole treatment. In other treatments, there is
an announced permanent price change starting from the fth round where the price increases
from 5 to 8.5.
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individual labor choice has a signicant impact on wage.7
The objective of the subjects in the experiment is to maximize their earnings
over time by optimally allocating labor in the two markets in the experiment.












































7Ideally, with a larger budget, the results from an experiment with ve group 1 members
would be compared with results from a similar group with more subjects in order to test
the assumption that individuals act as though the wage is given when there are ve group 1
members only.
8We assume for the experiment that the discount factor is equal to 1. This implies that
the earnings during each round is equally weighted. This particular assumption simplies the
problem for the subjects without compromising the main results of the theoretical model. It
must be noted that, although the discount rate in the experiment does not change, the subjects
may have their own internal discount factor. Camerer et al. (2004) review a number of studies
to determine the extent to which internal discount factors impact laboratory experiments.
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These rst order conditions are used to determine the optimal dynamic Nash
equilibrium path.
5.3.2 Simulated Results
In order to solve for the open loop Nash equilibrium solutions, the General Al-
gebraic Modeling System (GAMS) was used to derive simulated results under
the assumptions of heterogeneous and homogeneous community members (see
Appendix E.3 for the commands used). The algorithm used to solve for the
numerical solution is known as the Branch and Bound process which was rst
proposed by Land and Doig (1960). The basic idea of the algorithm is to nd the
minimum or maximum value of a function given the domain or feasible region of
a variable. The process utilizes two tools: the rst tool nds a way to cover the
feasible region by dividing it into feasible subregions (branching) and the second
tool is a fast way of nding the upper and lower bounds of a function in the sub-
region (bounding). For example, to nd the maximum value of a function f(x),
the domain of x will be subdivided into a number of regions. If the upper bound
of the function in the rst subregion is less than the upper bound of the function
in the second subregion, then the rst subregion can be discarded. If it is greater
than the second subregion, the upper bound value from the rst subregion will
be stored and compared with the next subregion. This process continues until
the highest upper bound amoung all the subregions has been found.9
Two di¤erent types of solutions are simulated - the dynamic Nash equilibrium
path and the myopic Nash equilibrium path. The dynamic Nash equilibrium path
represents the optimal open-loop strategy of individuals when subjects formulate
9Brusco and Stahl (2005) summarize the method and applications of the algorithm.
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a strategy that maximizes their own welfare during the entire duration of the game
given that all other individuals also maximize their own welfare. Here, we are
solving out the problems in equations (2.7) and (2.13) for the homogeneous and
heterogeneous cases, respectively, over 10 periods. As an alternative hypothesis,
the myopic Nash equilibrium path is simulated. The myopic Nash path implies
that the stock e¤ect is not taken into consideration during each period.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the dynamic versus myopic Nash equilibrium
paths with and without price changes for the case where all community members
are homogeneous. In the dynamic case, the optimal voting strategy is to keep
the resource sector open during the rst four periods and then to close it o¤
during the remaining periods. Optimal labor allocation in the resource sector is
equal to zero during the rst four rounds but, afterwards, ranges from 3 to 5.
When an announced price increase is known during the fth round, community
members anticipate the increase in returns to harvesting in the future by limiting
non-community entrance from the rst four rounds to now only three rounds.
However, after the price increase, harvest steadily increases. A comparison of the
stock di¤erences between the two treatments show that the stock is conserved
when an announced price change occurs in the future.
With myopic individuals, the optimal management solution is to keep the
resource stock closed during each period. This is because they do not internalize
any of the potential benets of temporarily allowing non-community members
into the resource sector. Community members would simply equate the value of
marginal product of labor in both sectors of the economy without taking into
consideration the stock e¤ect over time. Furthermore, any price increase starting



















1 10 0 1.2 6.2 10 0 1.2 6.2
2 14.4 0 2 9 14.4 0 2 9
3 19.6 0 3 12.3 19.6 0 3 12.3
4 24.7 0 4 15.4 24.7 0.4 0 4.6
5 28.6 3 0 17.1 33.8 2.9 0 25.4
6 30.9 3.2 0 18.8 35.4 3.1 0 27.5
7 32.1 3.5 0 20.2 35.9 3.3 0 29.2
8 32.3 3.8 0 21.6 35.7 3.6 0 31.1
9 31.3 4.1 0 22.2 34.4 3.6 0 30.3
10 29.7 4.9 0 24.1 33.5 7.6 0 51.7
Sum 166.8 227.3
Baseline With price change during round 5
Time




















1 10 1.2 0 6.7 10 1.2 0 6.7
2 14 1.9 0 9.8 14 1.9 0 9.8
3 18.1 2.7 0 13.2 18.1 2.7 0 13.2
4 21.5 3.4 0 16.1 21.5 3.4 0 16.1
5 23.5 3.8 0 18 23.5 6.9 0 35.4
6 24.5 3.9 0 18.9 17.1 4.8 0 23.3
7 24.9 4 0 19.3 16.8 4.7 0 22.9
8 25 4 0 19.4 16.7 4.7 0 22.7
9 25.1 4 0 19.5 16.7 4.7 0 22.7
10 25.1 4.1 0 19.5 16.7 4.7 0 22.7
Sum 160.3 195.4
Baseline With price change during round 5
Time
Table 5.4: Myopic Nash Equilibrium Paths for Homogeneous Community Mem-
bers
leading to a decline in the stock over time.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 summarize the simulated results for heterogeneous commu-
nity members. We derive similar results as the homogeneous community member
case - the optimal property rights regime pattern is to keep the resource stock
open for several rounds and then closed afterwards. However, in both treatments
with and without the announced price change, the optimal solution is to keep the
resource sector open to non-community members during the rst three periods.
This is because any adjustment made to preserve the stock comes during the
round prior to the price increase. Since the fourth round already calls for closure
of the resource stock in the base case, we would not expect any change in the
property rights regime sequence in the case where an announced price change
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1 10 0 1.2 6.2 10 0 1.2 6.2
2 14.4 0 2 9 14.4 0 2 9
3 19.6 0 3 12.3 19.6 0 3 12.3
4 24.7 3.1 0 14.8 24.7 1.4 0 8.5
5 28.6 3.4 0 16.7 32.2 3.4 0 23.6
6 31.7 3.6 0 18.3 34.9 3.6 0 26.5
7 33.8 3.8 0 19.6 36.3 3.9 0 28.5
8 34.9 4 0 20.5 36.6 4.1 0 30
9 35.3 4.1 0 21.1 36.2 4.6 0 34.7
























Table 5.5: Dynamic Nash Equilibrium Paths for Heterogeneous Community
Members
occurs. In order to increase the stock during the fth round, less labor is put
in the resource sector during the fourth round. However, once the price increase
starts to take into a¤ect, more labor is allocated after the fth round.
Myopic behavior in the heterogeneous community treatment is also similar to
the homogeneous case. The median member always prefers to keep the resource
stock closed since the subject does not internalize the benets of keeping the
stock open. Furthermore, once a price increase occurs, rapid decline in the stock
ensues. Appendix E.4 show the individual Nash equilibrium choices over time.
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1 10 1.2 0 7 10 1.2 0 7
2 13.7 1.9 0 10.2 13.7 1.9 0 10.2
3 17.2 2.5 0 13.4 17.2 2.5 0 13.4
4 19.8 3 0 15.9 19.8 3 0 15.9
5 21.4 3.3 0 17.4 21.4 6.2 0 33.7
6 22 3.5 0 18.1 15.8 4.4 0 23.2
7 22.3 3.5 0 18.4 15.2 4.2 0 22.1
8 22.4 3.5 0 18.5 14.9 4.1 0 21.7
9 22.5 3.5 0 18.6 14.8 4.1 0 21.5






























5.4.1 Background of Subjects
A total of 96 subjects were recruited for the whole experiment where 24 subjects
volunteered per session.10 Out of the 24 subjects in each session, 20 were ran-
domly selected as group 1 members (representatives in the community), while
the remaining 4 represent group 2 members. Table 5.7 summarizes the charac-
teristics of the subjects in group 1. Most of the subjects participated in at least
one experiment prior to this experiment and also had an economics background.
At least a quarter of the respondents were graduate students.
5.4.2 Labor Allocation, Stock Dynamics, Property Rights
Regime Choices and Wages
The results of the experiment are summarized in Figures 5.2 to 5.17. Figures
5.2 and 5.3 compare the average total labor hour allocation in the resource sec-
tor observed from the experiment for each round with the myopic and dynamic
Nash equilibrium paths. Both the dynamic Nash and myopic Nash equilibrium
paths start at a low point and steadily increase. However, the observed aver-
age total labor allocation is signicantly larger than the myopic and dynamic
Nash equilibria in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous community cases.
When all community members are homogeneous, there is a decreasing trend in
10Sample selection bias is a potential problem in any laboratory experiment. However, given
the limitations of the study, we are not able to go into a detailed analysis regarding sample
selection problems that may occur. See Eckel and Grossman (2000) and Bellemare and Kroger










































Figure 5.2: Average Total Labor in Market 1 with Homogeneous Community
Members - Base Treatment
observed labor allocations over time. However, with heterogeneous community
members, there is more variability in total labor allocation and no discernible
trend of average observed labor allocations over time. It is interesting to note
that during the start of the rounds, the initial total labor allocations seem to be
signicantly larger than the optimal starting levels in the trajectory, but the gap
between average observed labor allocations and predicted labor allocations seems
to diminish over time.
In treatments where a price change is introduced, we see a consistent pattern
in the data (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). The average total number of labor hours
allocated in the resource sector is lowered prior to the fth round. Presumably,
this is due to the anticipation of earning more income by building up the stock























Figure 5.3: Average Total Labor in Market 1 with Heterogeneous Community
Members - Base Treatment
the price increase in the fth round is immediately followed by a spike in total
labor hours during the fth round. Afterwards, we see a relative decrease in
labor allocations. For the case of heterogeneous community members, the drop
in labor after the fth round is relatively smooth. In both homogeneous and
heterogeneous treatments, there is still persistent over-investment of labor in the
resource sector relative to both the dynamic and myopic Nash equilibrium paths.
The total labor allocation in Figures 5.2 to 5.5 represent labor hours in the
resource sector from both the community and non-community members. In gen-
eral, majority of the clusters tend to keep the resource stock open, not only
during the rst few periods but throughout the ten rounds. Table 5.8 shows the
average percentage of clusters in each treatment that have voted to keep the re-






















Figure 5.4: Average Total Labor in Market 1 with Homogeneous Community


















Figure 5.5: Average Total Labor in Market 1 with Heterogeneous Community
Members - Price Change Treatment
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Baseline With PriceChange Baseline
With Price
Change
1 100 75 100 87.5
2 100 75 87.5 87.5
3 75 87.5 100 100
4 87.5 87.5 100 62.5
5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5
6 87.5 87.5 87.5 100
7 75 87.5 100 87.5
8 62.5 100 87.5 87.5
9 75 75 87.5 100






Table 5.8: Percentage of Clusters that Vote to Keep the Resource Stock Open
baseline treatment, there is more tendency to keep the resource stock open dur-
ing the initial rounds. However, over time, we see that a smaller percentage of
clusters vote to keep the resource stock open. When an announced price change
occurs in the homogeneous community treatment, the clusters in general seem to
try to build the stock prior to the fth round by lessening non-community en-
trance into the resource stock. However, more entrance into the resource sector
is allowed over time. In the heterogeneous community treatments, there appears
to be more variability in the percentage of clusters that keep the resource stock
open or closed. However, when an announced price change occurs in the fth
round, we nd a decrease in the percentage of clusters that allow non-community
entrance prior to the price increase.
The previous illustrations have depicted the overall labor allocation in the
resource sector. However, we are more interested in looking at the allocation



















Figure 5.6: Average Group 1 Labor in Market 1 with Homogeneous Community
Members - Base Treatment
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 look at how all community members (group 1) allocate their
labor in the baseline treatment. Overall, there is still over-allocation of labor in
the resource sector relative to the optimal Nash equilibrium paths, especially dur-
ing the initial periods. In both cases when community members are homogeneous
or heterogeneous, the level of labor allocated in the resource sector is larger than
even the myopic Nash equilibrium outcome. Over time, however, there seems
to be a declining trend in the level of labor allocation by community members.
In both homogeneous and heterogeneous community member treatments, the la-
bor allocations over time seem to be converging to the myopic Nash equilibrium
trajectory.
When there is an announced price change in the future, we nd a decrease
in labor allocation prior to the fth round (see Figures 5.8 and 5.9). However,




















Figure 5.7: Average Group 1 Labor in Market 1 with Heterogeneous Community
Members - Base Treatment
are lower than the predicted labor investment during most rounds. The average
labor allocated by community members after the fth round is considerably less
than the myopic Nash equilibrium path but slightly more than the dynamic Nash
equilibrium path. The disparity in the increase may be due to the over-allocation
of labor by subjects during the initial rounds. Too much labor allocated in the
resource sector during the rst few rounds may have resulted in a relatively more
signicant decline in stock levels. Thus, less stock is preserved prior to the fth
round when the price increase occurs. In order to verify this supposition, we now
turn to the stock patterns over time.
The optimal stock evolution in both the dynamic and myopic Nash equilibrium
cases show that the stock rises over time given the optimal labor allocation and
property rights regime strategy (see Figures 5.10 to 5.11). However, in order





















Figure 5.8: Average Group 1 Labor in Market 1 with Homogeneous Community


















Figure 5.9: Average Group 1 Labor in Market 1 with Heterogeneous Community

















Figure 5.10: Average Stock Over Time with Homogeneous Community Members
- Base Treatment
stock, especially during the rst 3 rounds, in order to build it up. Given the
over-allocation of labor by subjects during the rst few rounds, there is a general
downward trend in the average stock levels over time in both baseline treatments.
The optimal stock levels increase in the dynamic and myopic Nash equilibrium
paths in the treatments with an announced price change. When subjects are
introduced with a price increase during the fth round, the average stock level
across the clusters slightly increases (Figure 5.12 and 5.13). However, the increase
in stock is short lived. The sudden increase in labor allocation into the resource
sector during the fth round dissipates the rise in the stock. This seems to
indicate that the initial levels of labor are critical in order to arrive at the optimal
trajectory. In a dynamic setting, choosing the wrong starting point may lead one






































Figure 5.12: Average Stock Over Time with Homogeneous Community Members


















Figure 5.13: Average Stock Over Time with Heterogeneous Community Members
- Price Change Treatment
The four illustrations below show how wages change in each round in the
four treatments of the experiment (see Figures 5.14 to 5.17). Wage changes
over time reect the opportunity cost of investing labor hours in the resource
sector. In the base treatments without any price change, wages are signicantly
larger than either the dynamic or myopic Nash equilibrium levels. This indicates
that subjects are over-harvesting the stock in the resource sector. When an
announced price change is in place, the optimal wage rate is still higher than
the Nash equilibrium paths. However, they seem to track more closely with the
myopic Nash equilibrium path. Wages decline prior to the fth round since more
labor is allocated in the manufacturing sector. Once the price increase is in e¤ect,






















































Figure 5.16: Average Wage Over Time with Homogeneous Community Members

















Figure 5.17: Average Wage Over Time with Heterogeneous Community Members
- Price Change Treatment
132
5.5 Analysis of the Data
Statistical analysis in this subsection is divided into two parts: (1) joint deter-
mination of the behavioral rule of labor allocation and property rights regimes
choice in group 1 (representing community members); and (2) testing the short-
run e¤ects of trade on stock.
5.5.1 Labor Allocation and Property Rights Regime Choice
There are two important components that inuence the stock level of a com-
mon pool resource over time: labor allocations in the resource sector; and the
institutions governing the use of the resource. Figures 5.6 to 5.9 displays the
trend of labor allocation in the resource sector by members of group 1. Based
on the gures, we nd that the overall mean labor allocations by members in
the community follow the relatively more myopic Nash equilibrium path. More
specically, the labor allocation path diverges from the optimal dynamic path
when faced with an announced price increase during the fth round. Another
important component determining stock over time is the type of property rights
regime selected by the community over time. Two measures of property rights
regimes were collected from subjects in group 1. The rst voting question asked
individuals if they preferred to keep the stock open to group 2 individuals or
not. Thus, we obtained a dichotomous measure of property rights regime types:
limited open access and common property resource management.11 Recall that
11The second voting question asked group 1 members to vote how many labor hours they
would allow group 2 into the resource sector. However, we focus our data analysis on the
results from the rst voting question. A dichotomous choice is analyzed in this case to arrive
at incentive-compatible decisions for community members. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite
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Table 5.8 summarizes the percentage of clusters that keep the resource stock open
during each round. The trend lends qualitative proof that in terms of choosing
the property rights regime governing the resource stock, community members
consider some of the future impact on their wealth since there is a tendency to
initially keep the resource stock open.
To formally test the initial hypotheses that labor allocations and property
rights regime choice follow a dynamic Nash equilibrium path, we derive the joint
mean squared deviations of labor allocation and property rights regime choice
for all rounds and compare it with the two competing Nash equilibrium paths.12
Table 5.9 summarizes the results from the analysis. Each value in the table
displays the mean squared deviation of the observed data from the equilibrium
path for a single treatment for a set of rounds.13 Thus, each row in the table
compares the mean squared deviation of observed labor allocations and property
rights regime choice from the dynamic Nash versus the myopic Nash equilibrium
path. The smaller mean squared deviation is indicated by an asterisk "*". For
all four treatment groups, all but one of the rows show that the mean squared
(1975) proved that if three or more choices are voted upon, the resulting outcome is not incentive
compatible. From the baseline model, this implies that an optimal value of non-community
labor in the resource sector equal to (greater than) zero implies preference for closing (opening)
the resource stock.
12For the heterogeneous community member case, we compare the subjectslabor allocations
with the optimal Nash equilibrium found in Appendix E.4.
















n where pjt is the
observed property rights regime by the jth cluster; lijt is the observed labor hour by the ith
individual at time t in the resource sector; pNjt is the optimal Nash property rights choice by
the jth cluster at time t; lNit is the optimal Nash labor hour by the i
th individual at time t and
n is the total number of observations.
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Dynamic Nash Myopic Nash
Baseline
Rounds 1-10 17.80 10.70*
Rounds 1-5 27.49 14.11*
Rounds 6-10 8.12 7.28*
Price Change
Rounds 1-10 19.85 13.71*
Rounds 1-5 25.52 16.89*
Rounds 6-10 14.16 10.70*
Baseline
Rounds 1-10 37.23 23.37*
Rounds 1-5 33.54 24.35*
Rounds 6-10 40.96 22.20*
Price Change
Rounds 1-10 34.24 30.01*
Rounds 1-5 25.83* 28.91
Rounds 6-10 42.65 31.12*
* Denotes the Solution Path that Minimizes the Mean Squared Deviation.
Note: Each entry in the table represents the mean squared deviation of the
labor hours of community members from the corresponding solution path.
Mean squared deviation is equal to 6 t  (l ijt -l ijt N ) 2 / n  + t j (p jt -p jt N ) 2 /n
where p jt  is the observed property rights regime by the j th  cluster; l ijt  is the
observed labor hour by the i th  individual at time t  in the resource sector;
p jt N  is the optimal Nash property rights choice by the j th  cluster at time t;
l it N  is the optimal Nash labor hour by the i th  individual at time t  and n  is





Table 5.9: Mean Squared Deviation of Labor Hours and Property Rights Regime
Choice by Community Members
deviation is smallest under the myopic Nash equilibrium path. This seems to
indicate that the null hypotheses stating that subjects follow a dynamic Nash
equilibrium path cannot be accepted. This particular result coincides with the
nding from Herr, et al. (1997) where subjects tend to decide myopically when
extracting from a dynamic resource stock.
The average payo¤s over the di¤erent treatments are summarized in Table
5.10. The average payo¤s are lower than the dynamic Nash equilibrium pay-
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Baseline Price Change Baseline Price Change
Average Payoffs 7.4 6.7 7.57 7.05
(standard deviation) (2.51) (1.44) (2.66) (1.94)
Myopic Nash Equilibrium Payoff 7.54 7.23 7.34 7.03
Dynamic Nash Equilibrium Payoff 7.84 8.41 8.04 8.71
Ratio of Average Payoff to
Myopic Nash Equilibrium Payoff
0.98 0.93 1.03 1
Ratio of Average Payoff to
Dynamic Nash Equilibrium Payoff






Table 5.10: Average Payo¤ of Subjects Relative to Optimal Solution
o¤, with the ratio of payo¤s ranging from 80% to 94%. However, payo¤s are
relatively closer to the myopic Nash equilibrium path payo¤, with the ratio of
payo¤s ranging from 93% to 103%. These payo¤s further support the alternative
hypothesis that individuals follow the myopic Nash equilibrium path closer than
the dynamic Nash equilibrium path. 14
Two potential reasons can be cited to explain such a phenomenon in this
particular experiment. First, subjects may have been led to a non-optimal dy-
namic trajectory due to their initial labor allocations during the beginning of
14It must be noted that a at-payo¤ problem may exist, i.e. subjects may not have enough
incentive to derive the optimal path given the parameters of the model. Parameters were chosen
to create enough of a di¤erence between total earnings when choosing either the Myopic or the
Dynamic Nash equilibrium paths. However, the di¤erences in actual dollar earnings in each
round between the two potential equilibrium paths may not have been large enough for some
subjects to spend time deriving the optimal result. This implies that caution must be taken
when interpreting some of the disaggregated round by round results of the model.
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the round. Subjects may have understood the importance of planning over the
whole ten periods and tried to maximize wealth. However, because of the wrong
choices during the rst few rounds, they may have started on the "non-optimal"
dynamic trajectory path. The initial choices in the rst round are crucial in order
to arrive at the optimal dynamic trajectory path.
Another reason may be due to the assumption of perfect foresight throughout
the planning horizon in the theoretical model. The experiment was designed
to try to satisfy this particular assumption: a calculator was provided to show
how earnings are accumulated during each round; instructions were constructed
to show that there are benets of preserving the resource for future use; and
a practice session was conducted to give subjects the opportunity to plan out
their extraction path for the ten rounds. However, even with these items in the
experiment, they may not have been a su¢ cient proxy for perfect foresight.
It must be noted that a t-test across sessions and treatments were conducted
to test for any ordering e¤ects (Appendix E.5). The labor allocations for sessions
1 and 2 were compared with each other as well as sessions 3 and 4 holding
community e¢ ciency constant. The mean labor allocations did not show any
signicant di¤erences in the treatments of homogeneous community members
with an announced price change and heterogeneous community members with
no price change. However, it must be noted that there does seem to be some
signicant di¤erences in labor allocations in a few rounds when subjects are
homogeneous and there are no price changes and, to a lesser extent, the treatment
where individuals are heterogeneous and a price change is announced.
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5.5.2 E¤ect of Trade on Stock
In order to determine the e¤ect of an announced price increase on the stock,
the stock levels in the treatments without any price change are compared to the
treatment with the price change. Hypothesis 3 indicates that an announced price
change will lead to the community trying to build the resource stock up but will
lead to lower stock levels in the future. Using a t-test that compares the mean
stock level of the two treatments, we do nd a signicant positive di¤erence of
stocks in the treatment with an announced price change (Table 5.11). During
the fourth and fth rounds, the clusters in the homogeneous sessions responded
to the price change by building the stock up. However, community members
allocated more labor over time resulting in a decrease in stock levels over time.
During the last round, we do nd that the mean stock level is lower with the
price change than the baseline case, albeit a statistically insignicant amount. In
the heterogeneous community member case, however, stocks did not increase as
much as in the homogeneous community treatment. However, we did nd that
during the fth round, there was a slightly signcant increase in stock compared
to the base case.15
Most of the stock build up could be attributed to the decrease in labor allo-
cations prior to the price increase. Table 5.12 summarizes a t-test of the mean
di¤erences of labor allocation and percentage of votes favoring to keep the re-
source stock open. During the third and fourth rounds in both the heterogeneous
community member and homogeneous community member treatments, there is a
signicant decrease in labor allocations resulting in the increase of the stock. The
15The t-test for ordering e¤ects do not show any statistically signicant di¤erences in stock
levels across sessions, as shown in Appendix E.5.
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Treatment Baseline Price Change T-Stat
1 10.00 10.00 -
2 8.00 8.72 0.78*
3 7.32 8.38 0.63
4 6.75 8.50 1.02**
5 6.24 8.61 1.30***
6 5.90 7.44 0.79*
7 5.48 6.88 0.74*
8 5.14 6.29 0.72*
9 5.79 5.99 0.11
10 5.96 5.91 -0.03
1 10.00 10.00 -
2 8.93 9.52 0.59
3 8.38 8.54 0.1
4 6.53 7.23 0.42
5 6.21 7.57 0.87*
6 6.13 6.55 0.26
7 5.87 6.01 0.09
8 4.73 5.62 0.55
9 4.37 5.14 0.52
10 4.25 5.15 0.54
* 25% level of significance.
Note: *** 15% level of significance; ** 20% level of significance;
Homogeneous Community Members
Heterogeneous Community Members
Table 5.11: Di¤erences in Average Stock Levels Across Treatments
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property rights regime mechanism was also used in order to preserve the stock
until after the price increase, but to a lesser extent. During the fourth round in
the heterogeneous community member case, we nd that there was a signicant
decrease in the percentage of clusters that vote to keep the resource stock open.
Therefore, we do nd some support for hypothesis 3.
The evidence supports some of hypothesis 3 wherein subjects do internalize
some of the stock e¤ect over time. This seems to indicate that subjects do follow
a dynamic path, albeit non-optimal. The crucial role of selecting the correct
initial levels of labor allocation and property rights regime choice during the rst
few rounds heavily inuence the trajectory path in a dynamic framework.
In this chapter, we tested three hypotheses derived from the theoretical model
using a laboratory experiment. The experimental design is a variation of the
static common pool resource game. We develop a dynamic common property
resource game where subjects allocate their labor hours between two sectors in
the economy given a dynamic resource stock evolving over time. Results from the
experiment show that labor allocation and property rights regime decisions do
not follow the optimal dynamic path. It is closer to the myopic Nash equilibrium
path. However, an alternative explanation may be attributed to subjects choosing
a "non-optimal" dynamic equilibrium path instead. Subjects tended to start at
initial labor allocations away from the optimal starting point that would lead
them to the optimal dynamic Nash equilbrium. This may have led to choices
in labor allocation and property rights regimes that were along a non-optimal
dynamic path. We nd that resource stocks temporarily increase prior to the
price change. Stocks rise through lessening of labor and, to a lesser extent, by







1 24.50 28.74 -1.42* 100.0 75.0 1.53**
2 23.94 21.88 0.74 100.0 75.0 1.53**
3 26.75 17.36 3.67*** 75.0 87.5 -0.61
4 24.15 18.84 1.96*** 87.5 87.5 0
5 25.25 23.44 0.56 87.5 87.5 0
6 27.69 22.91 1.50** 87.5 87.5 0
7 22.28 20.46 0.63 75.0 87.5 -0.61
8 20.45 20.29 0.06 62.5 100.0 -2.05***
9 22.09 20.73 0.44 75.0 75.0 0
10 20.94 17.41 1.38* 87.5 87.5 0
1 23.00 20.85 0.64 100.0 87.5 1
2 24.76 22.34 0.8 87.5 87.5 0
3 27.50 19.78 2.44*** 100.0 100.0 0
4 24.05 17.64 2.04*** 100.0 62.5 2.05***
5 23.00 23.95 -0.26 87.5 87.5 0
6 23.75 17.36 1.75** 87.5 100.0 -1
7 25.39 18.41 2.06*** 100.0 87.5 1
8 24.80 20.48 1.12* 87.5 87.5 0
9 22.23 19.41 0.84 87.5 100.0 -1
10 21.46 16.05 1.52** 100.0 100.0 0
Labor Allocation in Group 1 Property Rights RegimeTreatment
Homogeneous Community Members
Heterogeneous Community Members
Note: *** 5% level of significance; ** 10% level of significance; *15% level of significance.
Table 5.12: Di¤erences in Property Rights Regime and Labor Allocation Across
Treatments
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of some of the stock e¤ect over time indicates that the non-optimal dynamic path
explanation is plausible.
In the experimental design, an open-loop strategy was simulated. However, if
the assumption of perfect foresight did not hold, then subjects may have tried to
play a closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategy. The current stock levels were never
shown to the subjects but they may have tried to infer the value of the stock
by comparing their round by round earnings between market 1 and market 2. It
would be interesting to determine the type of strategy played in time-dependent





International clamor regarding the potential degradation of the environment in
developing countries due to opening to trade has been an important issue that
has moved from the streets into academic studies. This dissertation links the
e¤ect of opening to trade on resource stocks in developing countries. The pri-
mary mechanism by which we link trade impacts on resource stocks is through
the endogenous property rights regime choice. The type of property rights regime
governing the resource stock, be it complete open access, common property re-
source management or private property management, has a signicant impact on
how the resource stock evolves over time. The model developed in this study
tries to explain how communities that have communal ownership of a resource
stock select the property rights regime governing the use of their resource stock
via a voting mechanism. Then, the impact of opening to trade is linked to the
choice of the property rights regime and, ultimately, stock changes over time.
We found that under some plausible assumptions, community members would
vote to allow non-community members into the resource sector. A necessary but
not su¢ cient condition for this to occur is when the harvestability coe¢ cient
of all community members is greater than the harvestability coe¢ cient of non-
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community members. Di¤erent property rights regime patterns are derived in
both nite and innite horizon models. Opening to trade, when the country has
comparative advantage in the production of resource intensive goods, does result
in a decrease in the long-run equilibrium stock. This particular impact of trade
on the environment is similar to what previous studies have reported. In this
study, as long as property rights regimes are endogenous, we nd that degrading
the resource stock can be an optimal solution! Thus, one of the messages of this
study is that as long as a country follows the optimal trajectory that degrades the
resource stock when opening to trade, then this is actually welfare maximizing. It
must be emphasized that one must follow the optimal trajectory path to maximize
welfare. If it is degraded too fast or even too slowly, then the country would not
be welfare maximizing.
We were able to test some of the basic theoretical results of the model using a
laboratory experiment. A dynamic common property resource game with two sec-
tors in the economy was designed and implemented. Results from the experiment
did show that subjects tried to preserve some of the stock for future extraction
when they know that the terms of trade in the resource sector would improve
in the future. Adjustments were made in labor allocation and property rights
regime choice before the price increase was implemented in order to preserve the
stock. After which, the stock was degraded again. Experimental results seem to
indicate that subjects did follow a dynamic path, but not the optimal one. The
initial choices of the subjects greatly inuenced the path which they take in the
future. Without instruments or more tools given to subjects in determining the
optimal starting point that yields the maximum their stream of welfare, subjects
will most likely follow a non-optimal dynamic path. Once communities follow a
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non-optimal dynamic path, they will have di¢ culty moving away from it without
any external shock. From a policy standpoint, supporting institutions must be
put in place to aid communities governing a resource stock to achieve an optimal
trajectory path.
Further research would extend this dissertation in the theoretical, experi-
mental and empirical directions. Theoretically, this model can be extended to
understand bargaining between owners of the resource stock and non-owners. In
some developing countries, small communities may have the rights over the use of
a resource such as a mine or forest but do not have enough technological e¢ ciency
to harvest from the resource optimally. Large companies who have capital and
resources usually enter and negotiate with community members. The theoretical
model can be extended to allow for Nash bargaining between the two entities in
order to determine conditions under which the resource is fully exploited or never
used at all. Furthermore, theoretical extensions can also be made with regard to
the evolution of property rights regimes. So far, we have not allowed any other
form of instruments, such as taxes or permits within the community, to directly
regulate open access within the community. It would be interesting to extend
this aspect of endogenous property rights regime choice through voting to obtain
more policy recommendations with regard to resource stock governance both by
the community and the government.
The basic experimental setup can be extended to allow for testing the role
of communication in enforcing property rights regime choice. In the basic setup,
all treatments allowed for communication. It would be interesting to compare
the results of all four treatments when communication does not exist or when
communication is costly. Furthermore, negotiations between group 1 and group
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2 members were non-existent. It would also be interesting to see what would
happen if negotiations were possible.
The basic theoretical results also provide a conceptual foundation for empirical
analysis. In order to empirically measure the impact of opening to trade on a
resource stock, it is important to measure the link between trade and property
rights regime. It is more likely than not that the indirect trade e¤ects through
the endogenous property rights regime channel is as signicant as the direct trade
impact on resource stocks, especially in developing countries.
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Appendix A
Numerical Example in Finite Horizon Model
A.1 Second Order Conditions in Homogeneous
Community Member Case





































The elements in the Hessian matrix are as follows,
@2Wj
@l2c0

































































































































































where: 1  p1cf(L c1; lc1): Note that due to the general equilibrium nature
of the model, the cross partial derivatives between lnt and lct are not symmetric.
The Hessian evaluated at the optimal values, lc0 = 0:409; lc1 = 2:988; ln0 =
1:685; and ln1 = 0; is
H =
266666664
 54:91  7:81  9:88 9:88
 7:81  9:50  65:02  55:01
 4:13 2:02  1:73 1:73
1:73 0:10 0:50  1:50
377777775
: (A.15)
From the Hessian, the determinants of the principal minors, are
det jHj =

 54:91  7:81  9:88 9:88
 7:81  9:50  65:02  55:01
 4:13 2:02  1:73 1:73
1:73 0:10 1:73  1:50
















 = 21308:9 > 0:
A.2 Second Order Conditions in Heterogeneous
Community Member Case










































































































































 23:35  1:04  13:07 0:54  13:05 0:54  32:52 1:63
 1:04  17:11  20:48  7:61  21:43  7:61  5:91  14:83
 13:15  2:04  23:24 0:53  13:14 0:53  32:78 1:59
 25:66  13:07 0:53  22:37  26:24  13:07  7:24  31:21
 12:70  4:46  12:72 1:16  23:19 1:16  31:45 3:49
 19:26  5:40  18:83  5:40 1:16  15:09  5:44  8:22
4:81  0:79 5:36 0:20 5:38 0:20 5:05 0:61
0:54  0:36 0:53 0:58 0:55 0:58 0:61  1:76
37777777777777777777775
:
The determinants of the principal minors are,
det jHcj =

 23:35  1:04  13:07 0:54  13:05 0:54  32:52 1:63
 1:04  17:11  20:48  7:61  21:43  7:61  5:91  14:83
 13:15  2:04  23:24 0:53  13:14 0:53  32:78 1:59
 25:66  13:07 0:53  22:37  26:24  13:07  7:24  31:21
 12:70  4:46  12:72 1:16  23:19 1:16  31:45 3:49
 19:26  5:40  18:83  5:40 1:16  15:09  5:44  8:22
4:81  0:79 5:36 0:20 5:38 0:20 5:05 0:61
0:54  0:36 0:53 0:58 0:55 0:58 0:61  1:76






 23:35  1:04  13:07 0:54  13:05 0:54  32:52
 1:04  17:11  20:48  7:61  21:43  7:61  5:91
 13:15  2:04  23:24 0:53  13:14 0:53  32:78
 25:66  13:07 0:53  22:37  26:24  13:07  7:24
 12:70  4:46  12:72 1:16  23:19 1:16  31:45
 19:26  5:40  18:83  5:40 1:16  15:09  5:44
4:81  0:79 5:36 0:20 5:38 0:20 5:05





 23:35  1:04  13:07 0:54  13:05 0:54
 1:04  17:11  20:48  7:61  21:43  7:61
 13:15  2:04  23:24 0:53  13:14 0:53
 25:66  13:07 0:53  22:37  26:24  13:07
 12:70  4:46  12:72 1:16  23:19 1:16
 19:26  5:40  18:83  5:40 1:16  15:09





 23:35  1:04  13:07 0:54  13:05
 1:04  17:11  20:48  7:61  21:43
 13:15  2:04  23:24 0:53  13:14
 25:66  13:07 0:53  22:37  26:24
 12:70  4:46  12:72 1:16  23:19





 23:35  1:04  13:07 0:54
 1:04  17:11  20:48  7:61
 13:15  2:04  23:24 0:53
 25:66  13:07 0:53  22:37
















 = 398:5 > 0:
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Appendix B
Deriving the Phase Diagram
In order to derive the phase diagram in the innite horizon model with homo-
geneous community members, we proceed in the following manner. First, we
obtain the relevant comparative statics needed to derive the isoclines. Next, we
use the comparative statics to derive the isoclines in the four regions of the phase
diagram. Lastly, we characterize the steady state equilibrium point.
B.1 Deriving the comparative statics
Using the denition t  t+1; the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangean is negative




































> 0 and @
2f(L ct;lct)
@l2ct
































































This particular result also holds as shown above.










Furthermore, the cross partial derivatives of the rst order conditions with










































































> 0; thus this is posi-
tive.




















































































































 0; and @lnt
@t
 0: We will
use the comparative statics to derive the isoclines in each region of the phase
diagram.
B.2 Deriving Isoclines in Each Region of the
Phase Space
Region 1. An interior solution exists for both controls (lnt > 0; lct < h)
The isoclines for S and  can be derived using the equations, 0 = @maxH
@t
and
0 = (1   )t    @maxH@St ; respectively. Using the implicit function theorem, we












































The terms in the parentheses are positive. Thus the last two terms are
negative. The growth rate of the stock from the maximum sustainable yield up to
maximum stock level (or carrying capacity) is negative, i.e. @G(St)
@St
 0: However,
from stock levels 0 to the stock at the maximum sustainable yield, @G(St)
@St
> 0:
We have assumed that @G(0)
@St
 Ccf(L ct; lct) + Nnf(L nt; lnt): The intrinsic
growth rate, @G(0)
@St
, is the maximum growth rate of the stock. An increase in stock
decreases the growth rate but increases the harvest from the stock. Thus, for all
stock levels from 0 to the stock at the maximum sustatinable yield, the sign of
@2maxH
@t@St























































: Since we have assumed that




The slope of the  isocline is derived using implicit function theorem on










































Since we have assumed that




> 0; the sign of @
2maxH
@S2t






 0: Therefore @t
@St t+1 t=0
 0:
Therefore, the S and  isoclines are upward sloping and downward sloping,
respectively, when we are in the region of the phase diagram where interior solu-
tions exist for both control variables.
In order to derive the equation of motion on each side of the isocline, we
take the derivative of the transition equation with respect to stock as well as the
derivative of the equation of motion for the user cost with respect to the user
cost.




= G0(St)  Ccf(L ct; lct) Nncf(L nt; lnt) < 0: (B.19)
Therefore, St+1 St < 0 to the right of the S isocline and the change in stock
is strictly positive to the left of the S isocline. Taking the derivative of the 




= (1  ) > 0: (B.20)
Therefore, t+1   t > 0 to the right of the  isocline and the change in user
cost is strictly negative to the left of the  isocline:
Region 2. An interior solution exists for own labor and the resource
sector is fully closed (lnt = 0; lct < h).
The isoclines for St and t can be derived using the same equations earlier,
0 = @maxH
@t
and 0 = (1   )t    @maxH@St ; respectively, but now evaluated at
lnt = 0. Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the slopes of the S









































































As shown in the previous section, @
2maxH
@2t
 0: Thus, @t
@St St+1 St=0
 0:










































The sign of @
2maxH
@S2t
 0: Since @2maxH
@St@t
 0; we derive @t
@St t+1 t=0
 0:
Therefore, the S and  isoclines are upward sloping and downward sloping,
respectively, when we are in the region of the phase diagram where lnt = 0 and
lct < h.
In order to derive the equation of motion on each side of the isocline, we
take the derivative of the transition equation with respect to stock as well as the
derivative of the equation of motion for the user cost with respect to the user
cost evaluated at lnt = 0.




= G0(St)  Ccf(L ct; lct) < 0: (B.26)
Since we have assumed that the growth rate is less than the marginal harvest,
St+1   St < 0 to the right of the S isocline and the change in stock is strictly
positive to the left of the S isocline. Taking the derivative of the  isoclines with
respect to  yields,
@(t+1   t)
@t
= (1  ) > 0: (B.27)
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Therefore, t+1   t > 0 to the right of the  isocline and the change in user
cost is strictly negative to the left of the  isocline:
Region 3. An interior solution exists for non-community labor and
the representative community member devotes all labor into the re-
source sector (lnt > 0; lct = h)
The isoclines for St and t can be derived using the same equations earlier,
0 = @maxH
@t
and 0 = (1   )t    @maxH@St ; respectively, but now evaluated at
lct = h. Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the slopes of the S









































































As shown in the previous section, @
2maxH
@2t
 0: Thus, @t
@St St+1 St=0
 0:










































The sign of @
2maxH
@S2t
 0: This results in @t
@St t+1 t=0
 0:
Therefore, the S and  isoclines are upward sloping and downward sloping,
respectively, when we are in the region of the phase diagram where lnt > 0 and
lct = h.
In order to derive the equation of motion on each side of the isocline, we
take the derivative of the transition equation with respect to stock as well as the
derivative of the equation of motion for the user cost with respect to the user
cost.




= G0(St)  Ccf(L ct; h) Nncf(L nt; lnt) < 0: (B.33)
Therefore, St+1 St < 0 to the right of the S isocline and the change in stock
is strictly positive to the left of the S isocline. Taking the derivative of the 
isoclines with respect to  yields,
@(t+1   t)
@t
= (1  ) > 0: (B.34)
Therere, t+1   t > 0 to the right of the  isocline and the change in user
cost is strictly negative to the left of the  isocline:
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Region 4. The representative community member fully specializes
in the resource sector and votes to close it o¤to non-community mem-
bers (lnt = 0; lct = h).
Evaluating the steady state stock at the control constraints, we arrive at,
0 = G(St)   CcStf((C   1)h; h): Thus, the S isocline is vertical in this region
of the phase diagram.
The steady state equation representing the  isocline is 0 = (1   )t  
(G0(St)  Ccf((C   1)h; h))  pcf((C   1)h; h): The resulting slope of the 












 0; we nd @t
@St t+1 t=0
 0:
Therefore, the S and  isoclines are vertical and downward sloping, respec-
tively, when we are in the region of the phase diagram where the constraints in
the control variables are both binding.
In order to derive the equation of motion on each side of the isocline, we
take the derivative of the transition equation with respect to stock as well as the
derivative of the equation of motion for the user cost with respect to the user
cost.




= G0(St)  Ccf(L ct; h) < 0: (B.36)
Therefore, St+1 St < 0 to the right of the S isocline and the change in stock
is strictly positive to the left of the S isocline. Taking the derivative of the 
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isoclines with respect to  yields,
@(t+1   t)
@t
= (1  ) > 0: (B.37)
Therere, t+1   t > 0 to the right of the  isocline and the change in user
cost is strictly negative to the left of the  isocline:
B.3 Characterizing the Steady State Solution
By inspection, the equilibrium is a saddle point in Region 4. But we can conrm
it locally by linearizing the system around the steady state equilibrium. Recall
that the steady state equation when lnt = 0 and lct = h can be written as,
t+1 t = (1 ) (G0(S) Ccf((C 1)h; h) pcf((C 1)h; h) = f(S; );
(B.38)
St+1   St = G(S)  CcSf((C   1)h; h) = g(S; ): (B.39)
The rst order approximation of the two equations above are,
f(S; ) = f(S; ) + fS(S
; )(S   S) + f(S; )(  ); (B.40)
g(S; ) = g(S; ) + gS(S
; )(S   S) + g(S; )(  ): (B.41)




; ); and g(S; ); we can write the system of equa-
tions in the following matrix formulation,
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264 t+1   t
St+1   St
375 =








264 (1  )   @2G(S)@S2
0 @G(S)
@S
375 is called the Jacobian matrix. When the
determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative, the characteristics roots are op-
posite in sign, which implies that a saddlepoint exists. If we operate on the area
beyond the maximum sustainable yield of the stock, we derive @G(St)
@St
< 0: Thus,
the determinant of the matrix is negative which means that this is a saddle path.
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Appendix C
Deriving E¤ect of Change in Terms of Trade on
Stock
C.1 Comparative Statics in Two-Period Model
In order to prove supermodularity, all the cross partial derivatives must be non-
negative. Using the rst order conditions from equations (2.8) to (2.11), we can
derive the cross partial derivatives of the set f( lc0); lc1; ( ln0); ( ln1); p1g on








  0; (C.1)
since @S1
@lc0















when pc 1C(c+n) > 0 and since
@2f(L c0;lc0)
@ln0@lc0



















































  0; (C.5)
since @S1
@( ln0)  0 and
@f(L c1;lc1)
@lc1








  0; (C.6)
since we assume that @
2f(L c1;lc1)
@lc1@ln1








  0; (C.7)















  0; (C.8)
since @S1
@ln0
 0; and @f(L c1;lc1)

































  0 (C.10)
since @f(L c1;lc1)
@ln1
 0; we derive @
2Wj
@p1@( ln1)  0:
Thus, since the cross partial derivatives of the set f( lc0); lc1; ( ln0); ( ln1);







 0 and @ln1
@p1
 0:
C.2 Comparative Dynamics in Innite Horizon
Model
C.2.1 Deriving Shifts in Long Run Supply and Long Run
Demand Curves




: Taking the derivative of

















































The sign of the numerator is not immediately known. However, substituting












































































































The sign of the numerator is not immediately known. However, substituting








































































> 0 which implies that @lnt
@p
 0:
Using the comparative statics, we can now derive the shifts in the S and u
isoclines. First, we start with the shifts in the long run supply curve. Using the
implicit function theorem on 0 = @maxH
@t
to derive the change in marginal user


















































































0; we nd @
2maxH
@t@p
 0: Therefore, @ut
@p St+1 St=0
 0:
Using the implicit function theorem on 0 = @maxH
@t
to derive the change in












 0 and @2maxH
@t@p





 0 and @St
@p St+1 St=0
 0, we nd that the long run supply
curve shifts up and to the left.
Utilizing the same procedure, we can show that the long-run demand curve
shifts down to the left. Using the implicit function theorem on 0 = (1   )t  
 @maxH
@St














































> 0; we nd that @
2maxH
@St@p
 0: Thus, @ut
@p ut+1 ut=0
 0:
Using the implicit function theorem on 0 = (1  )t   @maxH@St ; we can derive












 0 and @2maxH
@St@p





 0 and @St
@p ut+1 ut=0
 0, we nd that the long run demand
curve shifts down and to the left.
C.2.2 Deriving the Change in Long-Run Equilibrium Stock
and Marginal User Cost
In order to obtain the change in the steady state values given a change in price,
we simultaneously solve for the impact of price using (2.28) and (2.29). The
 isocline is derived from (1   )t    @maxH@St = 0: Totally di¤erentiating with




















The S isocline is derived from @maxH
@t
















We can re-write (C.16) and (C.17) in matrix form,














The e¤ect of price on the steady state stock and steady state marginal user










































 0; and @2maxH
@t@p


































> 0; we cannot de-






Phase Diagram Derivation with Endogenous
Tari¤s
In order to derive the phase diagram in the innite horizon model with endoge-
nous tari¤s, we follow the same procedure as in Appendix B. We obtain the
comparative statics needed to derive the isoclines in the regions of the phase
diagram. Then, we characterize the steady state equilibrium point.
The signs from the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangean remains the same as














a(qS   qK)pdS;tpdK;t + Yx(K;Lxt)








a(qS   qK)pdS;tpdK;t + Yx(K;Lxt)
2 @Y (K;Lxt)@lnt  0: (D.2)
We nd that @p

@lct
 0 and @p
@lnt
 0 since @Y (K;Lxt)
@lnt
 0 and @Y (K;Lxt)
@lct
 0:


















































































 0 and @2L
@lnt@lct
 0:


































































































































































Using the comparative statics showing the relationship between the marginal
user cost and stock on labor allocation choices, we derive the isoclines in each
region of the phase space.
Region 1. An interior solution exists for both controls (lnt > 0;
lct < h).
The isoclines for St and t can be derived using the following equations,
0 = @maxH
@t
and 0 = (1 )t  @maxH@St ; respectively. Using the implicit function
theorem, we can derive the slopes of the S isocline and  isocline. The slope of




























































































































Similar to Appendix B, we nd that @t
@St t+1 t=0
 0:
Therefore, the S and  isoclines are upward sloping and downward sloping,
respectively, when we are in the region of the phase diagram where interior solu-
tions exist for both control variables.
In order to derive the equation of motion on each side of the isocline, we
take the derivative of the transition equation with respect to stock as well as the
derivative of the equation of motion for the user cost with respect to the user
cost.




= G0(St)  Ccf(L ct; lct) Nncf(L nt; lnt) < 0: (D.20)
Therefore, St+1 St < 0 to the right of the S isocline and the change in stock
is strictly positive to the left of the S isocline. Taking the derivative of the 
isoclines with respect to  yields,
@(t+1   t)
@t
= (1  ) > 0: (D.21)
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Therefore, t+1   t > 0 to the right of the  isocline and the change in user
cost is strictly negative to the left of the  isocline:
Region 2. An interior solution exists for own labor and the resource
sector is fully closed (lnt = 0; lct < h).
The isoclines for St and t can be derived using the same equations earlier,
0 = @maxH
@t
and 0 = (1   )t    @maxH@St ; respectively, but now evaluated at
lnt = 0. Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the slopes of the S





































































As in Appendix B, we nd @t
@St St+1 St=0
 0.










































The sign of @
2maxH
@S2t
 0: This results in @t
@St t+1 t=0
 0:
Therefore, the S and  isoclines are upward sloping and downward sloping,
respectively, when we are in the region of the phase diagram where lnt = 0 and
lct < h.




= G0(St)  Ccf(L ct; lct) < 0: (D.27)
Therefore, St+1 St < 0 to the right of the S isocline and the change in stock
is strictly positive to the left of the S isocline. Taking the derivative of the 
isoclines with respect to  yields,
@(t+1   t)
@t
= (1  ) > 0: (D.28)
Therefore, t+1   t > 0 to the right of the  isocline and the change in user




E.1 Sample Instruction Sheet
ID _____________ Session name ____________
Your ID and Session names are provided above. If you are accidentally logged
o¤ the main experiment, raise your hand and someone will come to you. Please
Note: DO NOT CLOSE YOUR INTERNET EXPLORER FOR THE MAIN
EXPERIMENT. Also, DO NOT click the Backbutton on the browser unless
instructed to do so and refrain from clicking nexton the screen multiple times.
Earnings:
By just appearing today, you will receive a $5 show up fee. More money
can be earned by accumulating computer dollarsduring the experiment. The
more computer dollars you make during the experiment, the more real dollars you
receive. One real dollar is equivalent to 26 computer dollars. You may also earn
more money during the post survey questionnaire. If you follow all instructions
carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money
which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Please note: your




You have been randomly assigned into one of the six-person clusters. There
are two distinct groups in each cluster: group 1 and group 2. Five individuals
are in group 1 and the remaining person is the sole representative of group 2.
Throughout the duration of the experiment, you will stay in these groups. Any
decision made by the representative from group 2 will be weighted 5 times more.
This will be fully explained later on. For this experiment, you are a group ___
member.
Sequence of choices:
Please look at the projector screen in front of you to see the sequence of
choices. There are two sets in the experiment with each set lasting a total of
10 rounds. In each round, group 1 members will act rst. Every individual is
endowed with 10 labor hours during each round, which can be allocated to market
1 or market 2. Only values up to 1 decimal point between 0 and 10 are allowed
(for example 5.2 is allowed but not 5.25). Group 1 members will place in the box
the number of labor hours to allocate in market 1. The remaining labor hours will
be allocated into market 2. Each group 1 member will also vote on how much
group 2 labor hours they allow in market 1. Next, the group 2 representative
will choose how many labor units to allocate in market 1 given the maximum
allowed by group 1. The remaining labor hours not in market 1 will be allocated
in market 2. The wage, voting outcome, labor allotment in each market and total
earnings for that round will be posted, after which, a new round will begin again.
Each round will last a maximum of 2 minutes: 1 minutes for group 1 decisions
and 1 minute for group 2 decisions.
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Decisions and Scenario in Market 1:
If you allocate labor hours in market 1, you are engaged in collecting a stock.
Your earnings in market 1 are equal to your labor hours (LH) as a fraction of
total labor (TL) hours in market 1 multiplied by your e¢ ciency parameter (E),
the price of the stock (P) and total stock collected (SC),
Earnings from market 1= SC x (LH / TL) x (E) x (P).
The e¢ ciency parameter (E) is a number reecting how well you collect the
stock relative to other individuals. The larger the parameter, the more you can
earn in market 1. In the rst 10 rounds of the experiment, all group 1 members
have di¤erent e¢ ciency parameters. You will know the ranking of e¢ ciency
parameters within your cluster based on the login name shown in the messenger
program. The ranking of the e¢ ciency parameter of the group 1 members in your
cluster from highest to lowest are: Highest (1) cluster____; (2) cluster____
; (3) cluster____; (4) cluster____; and (5) cluster____ Lowest. You are
ranked ____. The e¢ ciency parameter of all group 1 members is larger than
the e¢ ciency parameter of the group 2 representative. It is important to note
that the person in group 2 represents 5 people. So, 1 unit of labor hour by the
representative from group 2 in market 1 is equivalent to 5 units of labor hours.
Total stock collected (SC) depends on total labor (TL) in market 1 as well as the
current stock (CS). The amount of stock will grow over time. If there is more
current stock (CS) available, you can collect more of it and earn more money.
The stock in the next round (SN) is equal to the growth of the stock (GS) plus
the current stock (CS) minus total collection of all members in the cluster (CC),
i.e. SN = GS + CS -CC. In the rst round of the set, stock is equal to 10 but
the maximum stock can potentially grow to 80 over several rounds. Allowing the
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stock to grow can impact your earnings signicantly. For example, if everyone
in your cluster allocates 5 units of labor hours when the stock is 10, everyone
earns approximately 5 currency dollars. But if the stock reaches 80 and everyone
puts in 5 units of labor hours, everyone earns 40 currency dollars (see Table 1
for estimated earnings at di¤erent stock levels)! In order to make the stock grow
faster, less stock needs to be collected in the current round. Collection of all
members in the cluster (CC) is equal to the sum of collection of each individual
member in the cluster. Individuals with larger e¢ ciency parameters will decrease
more the available stock in the next round. In summary, your earnings will depend
on the fraction of your labor relative to total labor, stock, price and an e¢ ciency
parameter. The larger these factors, the larger your earnings in market 1. You
can only control your own labor and stock. The available stock in the next round
depends on the growth of the stock, current stock and total collected stock from
all members.
If you are a group 1 member, you will also vote to determine the maximum
labor hours you allow the person from group 2 to allocate in market 1. Group
1 members will rst vote on either fully closing the stock or keep it open to the
group 2 representative. If majority prefer to close the stock, group 2 members
will not be allowed to allocate any labor hours in market 1. All labor hours of
group 2 members will immediately go to market 2. If majority in your cluster
prefer to keep the stock open, a secondary voting question will be tallied. In the
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secondary voting question, you will be given a choice from 1 to 10. You will vote
on the average labor hours of each group 2 member you allow in market 1. The
majority choice will be carried through. If the majority is in favor of an average
of 5 labor hours allowed in market 1, the group 2 representative can allocate less
than or equal to 5 labor hours in market 1. If a tie occurs, the average of the top
choices will be taken. Again, 1 unit of labor hour in market 1 is equivalent to 5
labor hours for the group 2 representative. Note that even if you vote to fully
close the stock, it is still important to vote on the second question. If the group
votes to keep the stock open but you prefer to close it, your vote in the second
question will still be tallied!
Decisions and Scenario in market 2:
Earnings in market 2 are equal to the wage multiplied by the remaining
amount of labor hours not allocated into market 1, i.e.
Earnings in market 2 = wage x (10 - labor hours in market 1)
The wage is determined by how many labor hours are allocated in market
2. If more participants devote labor hours into market 2, wage decreases. Thus,
wage may vary in each round. The range of wage is from 0.25 to 6.75 currency
dollars per labor hour, with a mean of 3.5. If everyone in your cluster devoted all
their labor hours in market 2, each individual would earn 0.25 x 10 labor hours
= 2.50 computer dollars for that particular round. If everyone in the cluster
allocates 5 labor hours in market 2, each individual earns 3.50 x 5 labor hours =
17.50 computer dollars for that round. Again, the person in group 2 represents
5 people. So, 1 unit of labor hour in market 2 is equivalent to 5 units of labor
hours. Note that when the stock is fully closed, all labor hours from the group 2
representative enters into market 2 thereby decreasing wage for everyone!
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Calculator box:
In order to aid your decision, a calculator box is provided. In the rst box,
place the number of labor hours you allocate in market 1. In the second box,
place how many labor hours in total you expect all other individuals to put in
market 1. Press calculatewhen you are nished. The estimated stock in the
next round, wage, and earnings in each sector will be provided. Note that this
will only be an estimated amount since there are di¤erences in the e¢ ciency
parameter across individuals and only the average e¢ ciency parameter is used in
the calculator. During the experiment you will only be able to use the calculator
5 times during each round. So choose carefully!
Communication:
As stated earlier, group 1 members will be able to identify the e¢ ciency of
each member in market 1 as well as each other through the messenger system.
All group 1 members will be allowed to communicate throughout all the rounds
while using the calculator box. Before the beginning of the experiment, members
from Group 1 will be given 3 minutes to chat with other members of their group
about the experiment. Once the 3 minutes are nished, group 1 members will
be given 2 minutes to input their choice for the rst round. Please note: YOUR
CHAT MANUSCRIPT WILL BE COLLECTED AFTER THE EXPERIMENT
SO PLEASE DO NOT CLOSE YOUR CHAT BROWSER. Group 2 representa-
tive will not be allowed to chat.
Summary
1. If you are a group 1 member, you will allocate labor hours in market
1 and market 2 as well as vote on the maximum number of labor hours allowed
in market 1. In the voting questions, the majority decision will be implemented.
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Even if you vote to close o¤, you will still need to vote in the second question
in case majority prefer to keep the stock open.
2. Group 1 members can communicate throughout the duration of the
actual experiment while using the calculator box.
3. If you are a group 2 member, you will allocate labor hours in market 1
and market2 given the maximum allowed by group 1 members. All decisions by
the group 2 representative are weighted ve times.
4. Earnings in market 1 will depend on the fraction of your labor relative
to total labor, stock, price and an e¢ ciency parameter. The larger these factors,
the larger your earnings in market 1.
5. In market 1, you can only control your own labor and stock. If less
stock is collected in the current round, the stock will grow faster and more will
be available in the next period. Individuals with larger e¢ ciency parameters
can harvest more of the stock but this means that they take away more of the
stock for the next rounds. The group 2 representative has the lowest e¢ ciency
parameter in the cluster.
6. In market 2, earnings are equal to wage multiplied by remaining labor
hours not allocated in market 1. Wage decreases when more labor hours are in
market 2. If market 1 is closed o¤to group 2, all their labor hours will immediately
go to market 2 thereby decreasing wage for everyone.
The rst internet explorer that is currently opened is a test run. We will now
conduct 2 rounds as a test to familiarize yourselves with the experimental setup.
Your earnings in the rst two rounds will not go toward your total earnings. After
you have nished with the 2 rounds, please close this internet browser. Are there
any questions before we start?
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E.2 Computer Interface Screens
Sample Screen for Group 1 Members
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Sample Screen for Group 2 Members
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E.3 GAMS Program Commands
    sets
    t time periods /1*10/
    firstyr(t) first time period
    lastyr(t) last time period;
    firstyr(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1);
    lastyr(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq card(t));
    scalars
    a intrinsic growth rate /0.59/
    b maximum stock /80/
    c wage intercept /6.75/
    d wage slope /0.0325/
    f harvest function int /50/
    g harvest function sl /0.001/
    h labor endowment /10/
    e harvesting efficiency for comm mem
/0.0004/
    z harvesting efficiency for non commm
/0.00025/
    p price /5/
    r discount rate /0.0/;
    variables
    w wealth of representative community
member
    m(t) own labor
    n(t) non-community labor
    s(t) resource stock;
    integer variables m(t), n(t);
    equations
    objfunc objective function
    start(t) initial condition for stock
    stock(t) intermediate stock
    const(t) constraint
    nconstone(t) nash constraint one
    ;
    objfunc.. w =e=
    sum(t,((1/(1+r))**((ord(t)-1)))*((c-
2*d*5*((h-m(t))+(h-n(t))))*(h-m(t))
    + p*e*s(t)*(f-g*5*(m(t)+n(t)))*m(t)));
    const(t).. (c-2*d*5*((h-m(t))+(h-n(t))))
=l= p*z*s(t)*(f-g*5*(m(t)+2*n(t)));
    nconstone(t).. -(c-2*d*5*((h-m(t))+(h-
n(t))))+p*e*s(t)*(f-g*(6*m(t)+5*n(t)))+
    p*e*(5*z*s(t)*g*n(t)-5*e*s(t)*(f-
g*(6*m(t)+5*n(t))))*(f-
g*5*(m(t+1)+n(t+1)))*m(t+1) =l= 0;
    start(firstyr).. s(firstyr) =e= 10;




    MODEL FISH /ALL/;
    m.up(t) = 10; m.lo(t) = 0;
    n.up(t) = 10; n.lo(t) = 0;
    *s.up(t) = b;
    s.lo(t) = 0;
    m.l(t) = 5; n.l(t) =0;
    *option nlp=conopt2;
    *option mip=cplex;
    *option rminlp=conopt2;
    option minlp=sbb;
    *option iterlim=10000;
    *SOLVE FISH USING RMINLP MAXIMIZING w ;
    *abort$(fish.modelstat>2.5) "relaxed
model could not be solved";
    Solve FISH USING rminLP MAXIMIZING w ;
    *Solve FISH USING RMINLP MAXIMIZING w ;
    PARAMETERS
    manup(t) manufacturing profit
   resp(t) resource sector profit
    totprof(t) total profit
    wage(t) wage over time
    wageln(t) wage when the other guy comes
in
    vmprln(t) other vmp evaluated at ln;
    vmprln(t) = p*z*s.l(t)*(f-
g*5*(m.l(t)+2*n.l(t)));
    manup(t) = (c-2*d*5*((h-m.l(t))+(h-
n.l(t))))*(h-m.l(t));
    resp(t) = p*e*s.l(t)*(f-
g*5*(m.l(t)+n.l(t)))*m.l(t) ;
    totprof(t) = p*e*s.l(t)*(f-
g*5*(m.l(t)+n.l(t)))*m.l(t)+
    (c-2*d*5*((h-m.l(t))+(h-n.l(t))))*(h-
m.l(t));
    wage(t) = (c-2*d*5*((h-m.l(t))+(h-
n.l(t))));
 wageln(t) = (c-2*d*5*((h-m.l(t))+(h-
1)));
    DISPLAY manup, resp, wage, vmprln,
wageln, totprof;
Sample GAMS program for homogeneous community members
190
      sets
    t time periods /1*10/
    firstyr(t) first time period
    lastyr(t) last time period;
    firstyr(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1);
    lastyr(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq card(t));
    scalars
    a intrinsic growth rate /0.59/
    b maximum stock /80/
    c wage intercept /6.75/
    d wage slope /0.0325/
    f harvest function int /50/
g harvest function sl /0.001/
    h labor endowment /10/
    e1 harvesting efficiency for comm mem 1 /0.0003/
    e2 harvesting efficiency for comm mem 2 /0.00035/
    e3 harvesting efficiency for comm mem 3 /0.0004/
    e4 harvesting efficiency for comm mem 4 /0.00045/
    e5 harvesting efficiency for comm mem 5 /0.0005/
    z harvesting efficiency for non commm /0.00025/
    p price /5/
    r discount rate /0.0/;
    variables
    w wealth of representative community member
    m1(t) own labor of comm1
  m2(t) own labor of comm2
    m3(t) own labor of comm3
    m4(t) own labor of comm4
    m5(t) own labor of comm5
    n(t) non-community labor
    s(t) resource stock;
    integer variables m1(t), m2(t), m3(t), m4(t), m5(t), n(t);
    equations
    objfunc objective function
    start(t) initial condition for stock
    stock(t) intermediate stock
    const(t) constraint
    nconstone1(t) nash constraint 1
    nconstone2(t) nash constraint 2
    nconstone3(t) nash constraint 3
    nconstone4(t) nash constraint 4
    nconstone5(t) nash constraint 5
    ;
Sample GAMS program for heterogeneous community members
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objfunc.. w =e=
    sum(t,((1/(1+r))**((ord(t)-1)))*((c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-
m5(t))+
    5*(h-n(t))))*(5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+
    p*e1*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m1(t)+
    p*e2*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m2(t)+
    p*e3*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m3(t)+
    p*e4*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m4(t)+
    p*e5*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m5(t)));
    const(t).. (c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+
    5*(h-n(t)))) =l= p*z*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+10*n(t)));
    nconstone1(t).. -(c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+5*(h-n(t))))+
    p*e1*s(t)*(f-g*(2*m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))+
p*e1*(5*z*s(t)*g*n(t)+e2*s(t)*g*m2(t)+e3*s(t)*g*m3(t)+e4*s(t)*g*m4(t)+e5*s(t)*g
*m5(t)-
    e1*s(t)*(f-g*(2*m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t))))*
    (f-g*(m1(t+1)+m2(t+1)+m3(t+1)+m4(t+1)+m5(t+1)+5*n(t+1)))*m1(t+1) =g= 0;
    nconstone2(t).. -(c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+5*(h-n(t))))+
    p*e2*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+2*m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))+
p*e2*(5*z*s(t)*g*n(t)+e1*s(t)*g*m1(t)+e3*s(t)*g*m3(t)+e4*s(t)*g*m4(t)+e5*s(t)*g
*m5(t)-
    e2*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+2*m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t))))*
    (f-g*(m1(t+1)+m2(t+1)+m3(t+1)+m4(t+1)+m5(t+1)+5*n(t+1)))*m2(t+1) =g= 0;
    nconstone3(t).. -(c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+5*(h-n(t))))+
    p*e3*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+2*m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))+
p*e3*(5*z*s(t)*g*n(t)+e1*s(t)*g*m1(t)+e2*s(t)*g*m2(t)+e4*s(t)*g*m4(t)+e5*s(t)*g
*m5(t)-
    e3*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+2*m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t))))*
    (f-g*(m1(t+1)+m2(t+1)+m3(t+1)+m4(t+1)+m5(t+1)+5*n(t+1)))*m3(t+1) =g= 0;
    nconstone4(t).. -(c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+5*(h-n(t))))+
    p*e4*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+2*m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))+
p*e4*(5*z*s(t)*g*n(t)+e1*s(t)*g*m1(t)+e2*s(t)*g*m2(t)+e3*s(t)*g*m3(t)+e5*s(t)*g
*m5(t)-
    e4*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+2*m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t))))*
    (f-g*(m1(t+1)+m2(t+1)+m3(t+1)+m4(t+1)+m5(t+1)+5*n(t+1)))*m4(t+1) =g= 0;
    nconstone5(t).. -(c-2*d*((5*h-m1(t)-m2(t)-m3(t)-m4(t)-m5(t))+5*(h-n(t))))+
    p*e5*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+2*m5(t)+5*n(t)))+
p*e5*(5*z*s(t)*g*n(t)+e1*s(t)*g*m1(t)+e2*s(t)*g*m2(t)+e3*s(t)*g*m3(t)+e4*s(t)*g
*m4(t)-
    e5*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+2*m5(t)+5*n(t))))*
    (f-g*(m1(t+1)+m2(t+1)+m3(t+1)+m4(t+1)+m5(t+1)+5*n(t+1)))*m5(t+1) =g= 0;
    start(firstyr).. s(firstyr) =e= 10;
    stock(t+1).. s(t+1) =e= s(t)+a*s(t)*(1-(s(t)/b))-
    e1*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m1(t)-
    e2*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m2(t)-
    e3*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m3(t)-
    e4*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m4(t)-
    e5*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*m5(t)-
    5*z*s(t)*(f-g*(m1(t)+m2(t)+m3(t)+m4(t)+m5(t)+5*n(t)))*n(t);
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MODEL FISH /ALL/;
    m1.up(t) = 10; m1.lo(t) = 0;
    m2.up(t) = 10; m2.lo(t) = 0;
    m3.up(t) = 10; m3.lo(t) = 0;
    m4.up(t) = 10; m4.lo(t) = 0;
    m5.up(t) = 10; m5.lo(t) = 0;
    n.up(t) = 10; n.lo(t) = 0;
    *s.up(t) = b;
    s.lo(t) = 0;
    m1.l(t) = 5;
    m2.l(t) = 5;
    m3.l(t) = 5;
    m4.l(t) = 5;
m5.l(t) = 5;
    n.l(t) =0;
    *option nlp=conopt2;
    *option mip=cplex;
    *option rminlp=conopt2;
    option minlp=sbb;
    *option iterlim=10000;
    *SOLVE FISH USING RMINLP MAXIMIZING w ;
    *abort$(fish.modelstat>2.5) "relaxed model could not be solved";
    Solve FISH USING rminLP MAXIMIZING w ;
    *Solve FISH USING RMINLP MAXIMIZING w ;
    PARAMETERS
    manup1(t) manufacturing profit for 1
    manup2(t) manufacturing profit for 2
    manup3(t) manufacturing profit for 3
    manup4(t) manufacturing profit for 4
    manup5(t) manufacturing profit for 5
    resp1(t) resource sector profit for 1
    resp2(t) resource sector profit for 2
    resp3(t) resource sector profit for 3
    resp4(t) resource sector profit for 4
    resp5(t) resource sector profit for 5
    totprof1(t) total profit for 1
    totprof2(t) total profit for 2
    totprof3(t) total profit for 3
    totprof4(t) total profit for 4
    totprof5(t) total profit for 5
    wage(t) wage over time
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    *wageln(t) wage when the other guy comes in
    *vmprln(t) other vmp evaluated at ln
    ;
    *vmprln(t) = p*z*s.l(t)*(f-g*5*(m.l(t)+2*n.l(t)));
    manup1(t) = (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-
n.l(t))))*(h-m1.l(t));
    manup2(t) = (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-
n.l(t))))*(h-m2.l(t));
    manup3(t) = (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-
n.l(t))))*(h-m3.l(t));
    manup4(t) = (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-
n.l(t))))*(h-m4.l(t));
  manup5(t) = (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-
n.l(t))))*(h-m5.l(t));
    resp1(t) = p*e1*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m1.l(t) ;
    resp2(t) = p*e2*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m2.l(t) ;
    resp3(t) = p*e3*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m3.l(t) ;
    resp4(t) = p*e4*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m4.l(t) ;
    resp5(t) = p*e5*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m5.l(t) ;
    totprof1(t) = p*e1*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m1.l(t)+
    (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-n.l(t))))*(h-
m1.l(t));
    totprof2(t) = p*e2*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m2.l(t)+
    (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-n.l(t))))*(h-
m2.l(t));
    totprof3(t) = p*e3*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m3.l(t)+
    (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-n.l(t))))*(h-
m3.l(t));
    totprof4(t) = p*e4*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m4.l(t)+
    (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-n.l(t))))*(h-
m4.l(t));
    totprof5(t) = p*e5*s.l(t)*(f-
g*(m1.l(t)+m2.l(t)+m3.l(t)+m4.l(t)+m5.l(t)+5*n.l(t)))*m5.l(t)+
    (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-n.l(t))))*(h-
m5.l(t));
    wage(t) = (c-2*d*((5*h-m1.l(t)-m2.l(t)-m3.l(t)-m4.l(t)-m5.l(t))+5*(h-
n.l(t))));
    *wageln(t) = (c-2*d*5*((h-m.l(t))+(h-1)));
    DISPLAY manup1, manup2, manup3, manup4, manup5, resp1, resp2, resp3, resp4,
resp5,
    totprof1, totprof2 ,totprof3, totprof4, totprof5, wage;
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1 0 6.2 0 6.2 0 6.2 0 6.2 5.8 9.9
2 0 8.6 0 8.6 0 8.6 0 8.6 9.3 16.6
3 0 10.8 0 10.8 0 10.8 2.7 13.1 10 21.5
4 0 12.4 0 12.4 0 12.4 5.2 17.6 10 24.8
5 0 13.3 0 13.3 0 13.3 6.7 20.5 10 26.7
6 0 13.8 0 13.8 0 13.8 7.3 21.9 10 27.5
7 0 13.9 0 13.9 0 13.9 7.6 22.4 10 27.9
8 0 14 0 14 0 14 7.7 22.6 10 28
9 0 14 0 14 0 14 7.7 22.7 10 28.1
10 0 14 0 14 0 14 7.7 22.7 10 28.1
Sum 121.1 121.1 121.1 178.3 239
1 0 6.2 0 6.2 0 6.2 0 6.2 5.8 9.9
2 0 8.6 0 8.6 0 8.6 0 8.6 9.3 16.6
3 0 10.8 0 10.8 0 10.8 2.7 13.1 10 21.5
4 0 12.4 0 12.4 0 12.4 5.2 17.6 10 24.8
5 0 22.7 1 23.6 10 36.3 10 40.8 10 45.3
6 0 16.8 0 16.8 2 18.8 10 30.2 10 33.6
7 0 16.1 0 16.1 0.9 17 10 29 10 32.2
8 0 15.9 0 15.9 0.5 16.4 10 28.5 10 31.7
9 0 15.8 0 15.8 0.4 16.1 10 28.4 10 31.5
10 0 15.7 0 15.7 0.3 16.1 10 28.3 10 31.5
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E.5 Test for Ordering E¤ects
Session 1 Session 2 T-Stat Session 1 Session 2 T-Stat Session 1 Session 2 T-Stat
1 25.5 23.5 0.6 10 10 - 1 1 0
2 19.75 28.13 -3.51** 8.12 7.89 0.19 1 1 0
3 17.75 35.75 -5.60** 7.34 7.31 0.01 1 0.5 1.73
4 20.55 27.75 -2.15 7.44 6.06 0.53 0.75 1 -1
5 19.88 30.63 -3.52** 6.79 5.69 0.46 0.75 1 -1
6 22.38 33 -2.68 6.57 5.22 0.52 1 0.75 1
7 20.75 23.8 -0.96 5.6 5.36 0.08 1 0.5 1.73
8 18.3 22.6 -1.69 5.22 5.06 0.06 0.75 0.5 0.65
9 24 20.18 1.04 5.8 5.77 0.01 1 0.5 1.73
10 21.13 20.75 0.11 5.05 6.88 -0.48 1 0.75 1
1 24 22 0.43 10 10 - 1 1 0
2 27.25 22.28 1.12 8.33 9.53 -0.74 0.75 1 -1
3 30.5 24.5 1.26 7.36 9.4 -0.85 1 1 0
4 23.75 24.35 -0.13 4.16 8.9 -1.9 1 1 0
5 22.88 23.13 -0.05 3.77 8.65 -2.07 0.75 1 -1
6 27.13 20.38 1.18 3.86 8.4 -1.92 0.75 1 -1
7 24.15 26.63 -0.51 3.68 8.06 -1.66 1 1 0
8 25 24.6 0.07 2.93 6.53 -1.54 1 0.75 1
9 22.88 21.58 0.26 2.2 6.54 -2 0.75 1 -1
10 21.9 21.03 0.17 2.12 6.38 -1.8 1 1 0





Note: ** 5% level of significance
Critical t: 2.353, 3.182
Test for Ordering E¤ects of Baseline Treatments
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Session 3 Session 4 T-Stat Session 3 Session 4 T-Stat Session 3 Session 4 T-Stat
1 32.43 25.05 1.49 10 10 1 0.5 1.73
2 26.43 17.33 1.81 7.9 9.53 -1.12 0.75 0.75 0
3 15.23 19.5 -1.08 6.58 10.19 -1.76 1 0.75 1
4 19.03 18.65 0.09 7.52 9.47 -0.79 1 0.75 1
5 25.13 21.75 0.6 7.32 9.91 -0.88 1 0.75 1
6 22.7 23.13 -0.09 6.43 8.46 -0.63 1 0.75 1
7 19.88 21.05 -0.24 5.92 7.83 -0.69 0.75 1 -1
8 18.7 21.88 -0.66 6.13 6.45 -0.16 1 1 0
9 18.15 23.3 -1.05 6 5.98 0.01 1 0.5 1.73
10 16 18.83 -0.74 6.18 5.64 0.21 1 0.75 1
1 23.83 17.88 1.22 10 10 1 0.75 0.5
2 22.18 22.5 -0.08 8.94 10.1 -0.94 1 0.75 0.5
3 23.43 16.13 1.76 8.17 8.91 -0.34 1 1 0
4 23.65 11.63 2.79 7.04 7.41 -0.21 0.5 0.75 -0.43
5 29.9 18 2.36 7.6 7.54 0.04 0.75 1 -1
6 18.98 15.75 0.71 5.98 7.13 -0.67 1 1 0
7 25.13 11.7 2.82 5.26 6.76 -1.07 0.75 1 -1
8 26.38 14.58 2.29 4.69 6.54 -0.94 0.75 1 -1
9 29.63 9.2 4.66** 4.63 5.65 -0.66 1 1 0
10 23.68 8.43 3.17 4.17 6.13 -1.04 1 1 0
Heterogeneous Community Members
Note: ** 5% level of significance
Critical t: 2.353, 3.182
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